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Introduction 
 
Concept of customary international law (CIL) is an idea that there are informal, 
unwritten rules which are binding upon States. It is the important area of international law, 
where the law of State responsibility and State immunity, where applicable treaties do not  
exist.1  
 
Statue of International Court of Justice art 38 (1) states international conventions, 
international custom, general principle of law, judicial decision and teachings of the highly 
qualified publicists of various nations as sources of international law. Customary international 
law contains two elements- general practice of States known as objective element, and accepted 
legal obligation, also known as opinion juris, as subjective element.2 International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) has stated in cases concerning  North Sea Continental Shelf 3, two Fisheries 
Jurisdiction cases4 and Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua5 the 
importance and meaning of customary international law.  
 
There are three activities by states to establish of customary international law. A State 
can: freely subject itself to the customary rule (consent) or can keep silent (acquiescence) or 
consistently object the application of the rule. Silence may be interpreted as implied acceptance, 
or object towards the issue. 6 
 
According to Professor Nuno Marques Antunes silence as a concept in international law, 
also known as acquiescence (Latin quiescere means to be still) has primarily a substantive 
bearing. Rights and duties may be constituted, modified, disposed of or terminated by the effect 
of acquiescence. Once transposed into international law, the notion of acquiescence was 
developed and elaborated within the framework of the international legal system. This took 
place, throughout the last century, in a number of judicial and arbitral decisions, and also in 
doctrinal and scholarly writings. Acuter problems emerge nowadays when use of force emerge. 
                                                 
1 Byers, M. Customs, Power and the Power of Rules.  International Relations and customary 
International Law. Cambridge University Press, 1999.p 3, XI 
2 Art 38 (1) (a-d) of Statue of the International Court of Justice sets out sources of international law. 
3 ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf cases. 1969; para 74, 77 
4 ICJ, Fisheries Jurisdiction cases (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland) 
1972, 1973, para 52, 44 
5 ICJ, Case Concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, 1986, para 186 
6 Gebeyehu, H. Does consent always matter in international law? Lawyr.it. Accessible 
https://www.lawyr.it/index.php/articles/international-focus/682-does-consent-always-matter-in-
international-law (April 23, 3018) art 2 
4 
 
Silent conduct or inaction in respect of these issues will require a legal answer. A cautious 
approach to findings of acquiescence continues to be warranted, the burden of proof lying on 
the party invoking it. Instances in which this may be relevant are far from uniform, and silence 
or inaction is seldom an adequate manifestation of consent. The issues surrounding 
acquiescence relate ultimately to a sphere of discretion which States enjoy, their conduct being 
under scrutiny in what are usually rather complex situations.7 
 
During last couple of years some of the states have engaged themselves in various 
unusual activities and other states have not reacted, nor condemned the activities it could be 
assumed that states have accepted the unusual behavior. One can claim that we are seeing of 
emergence or acceptance of new customary international law. Silence interpreted as 
unconditional acceptance of the new custom. There are many reasons for the silence: states are 
unaware of the behavior of other states, states do not understand the consequences of the 
inaction and silence, states do not understand the importance of the current times, states might 
wish to reinforce its political or diplomatic ties, etc. United States of America (USA) and United 
Kingdom (UK) are bombing ISIS oil trucks in Syria claiming the trucks are loaded by war 
sustaining objects. 8  As no state protested it is considered now accepted behavior. Targeting 
“war sustaining” objects, even in the context of the fight against ISIS, sets a dangerous 
precedent and violates the established rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL).9  
    
The main aim of this study is to determine what is the meaning of silence as behavior in 
emergence or acceptance of possible new customary international law. The thesis is theoretical 
study and critical observation of the logic or enthusiastic interpretation that silence is immediate 
and unconditional acceptance of emerging new Customary International Law. The objective of 
the thesis is to examine, building on the examples of different approaches to customary 
                                                 
7 Antunes, N.S.M. Acquiescence. Max Plank Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Accessible 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1373?rskey=tnOAvH&result=1&prd=EPIL. (April 23. 2018) art 1- 20 
8 UK first air strikes on Syria target ISIS oilfields. Financial Times. Accessible 
https://www.ft.com/content/735eb4c8-998f-11e5-9228-87e603d47bdc. (Oct 12, 2017), 
U.S Warplanes strike ISIS oil trucks in Syria. New York Times. Accessible 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17/world/middleeast/us-strikes-syria-oil.html. ( Oct 12, 2017) 
US Air Force bomb 238 ISIS oil trucks in Syria, Mail Online. Accessible 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3331503/US-military-drops-leaflets-warning-civilian-truck-
drivers-45-minutes-airstrike.html. (Oct, 12, 2017) 
9 Padeanu, I.E. Accepting that war-sustaining objects are legitimate target under IHL is a terrible idea. 
Yale Journal of International Law. Accessible http://www.yjil.yale.edu/accepting-that-war-sustaining-
objects-are-legitimate-targets-under-ihl-is-a-terrible-idea/. ( Oct 12, 2017) 
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international law, to identify whether silence as behavior contribute to emerging new customary 
norm. In addition to discussing the legality of the possibly the thesis offer comparative view on 
different State practice and scholars writings and analyze whether and how the current approach 
is shaping modern customary law.  In order to achieve the objective, the thesis focuses upon 
the following research questions:  
 
1. How legal scholars interpret silence as there is no definition about customary 
international law?  
2. Is silence interpreted as unconditional acceptance or endorsement of the repeated 
behavior in customary international law? 
3. If yes, then based on what conditions and criteria? 
4. Are we seeing of emergence or acceptance of new customary international law 
about silence? 
 
The hypothesis of the thesis is: silence is as endorsement or acceptance of emerging 
customary international law. 
 
The main object of this study is based on states practice and legal scholar’s publications of 
customary international law. I try to seek to establish an understanding weather and how the 
international customary law has changed or evolved about silence over time.   
 
The systematic study of the research problem in customary international law and about silence 
is ever evolving and therefore a clear view on approach of silence as possible emerging 
customary international law is not quite clear and done yet.   Inequality among actors in 
international community may have grated effect on customary law-making as it lacks 
formalized procedure of law-making and the central role is played by states behavior. 
 
The thesis has two sections- first part will be emphasized on doctrine of costmary international 
law and its elements and their evolution, and second part will concentrate on the legal 
framework and sources of International Customary Law during fight against ISIS, the silences 
as interpretation of behavioral action and its legal meaning. The appropriate judicial practice is 
evaluated throughout the research paper to add value.  
 
Method and resources: The principle research methods used for the thesis have been analytical 
methods. The method was used for the extensive research of legal literature, analysis of 
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available case law and legislation. Main sources are different legal writings of renewed 
scholars, International Committee of the Red Cross studies about IHL, United Nations General 
Assembly draft decision about identifying the customary international law, United Nations 
Security Council resolutions and case law of International Court of Justice.  
 
Keywords, based on the Estonian Subject Thesaurus are: silence, International law, warfare 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
1 Concept of customary international law 
 
International Law Association found in its report in 2000 that general customary 
international law is created by State practice which is uniform, extensive and representative in 
character10. The main emphases is put on objective element of CIL as State practice.  The report 
de-emphases the subjective part as opinion juris of the CIL. 11  In 2005 International Committee 
of Red Cross (ICRC) published a study about Customary International Humanitarian Law. 
United States of America has given its concerns about the study’s faulty methodology and the 
flaws in study findings. In particular the ICRC study merges the State practice and opinion juris 
requirement into a single test. 12 
 
The classic theory of custom depends on a delicate, precarious, equilibrium between 
two opposite concerns: on the one hand, to permit customary rules to emerge without 
demanding the individual consent of every state; on the other hand, to permit individual states 
to escape being bound by any rule they do not recognize as such. To meet the first of these 
concerns, the classic theory narrows down the individual participation of each state to each of 
the two factors it regards as indispensable to the formation of a customary rule. The practice 
that constitutes the corpus of the customary rule is defined as "general," "consistent,", "settled," 
"constant and uniform," "both extensive and virtually uniform"-but never as "unanimous" or 
"universal." As far back as 1925, Charles De Visscher pointed out that "to rely on a customary 
rule against a state, it is not always necessary to be able to prove that that state, by its personal 
actions, contributed to the establishment of the international practice from which the rule 
derived," and he referred in illustration to customary rules that had come into being on the basis 
of practices accepted by maritime nations but in whose elaboration the landlocked states had 
taken no part. Similarly, it is not required that each state, individually and personally, should 
have had the feeling of "conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation," which constitutes 
                                                 
10 The committee of the report contain leading scholars from South Africa, Yugoslavia, Denmark, 
Slovenia, Netherlands, France, Italy, Australia, UK, Russia, Sweden, Bulgaria, Bangladesh, India, 
USA, Croatia, Germany, Brazil, Japan, Switzerland, Poland, Estonia.  
11 International Law Association London Conference (2000) Formation of customary general 
international law. Accessible 
https://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/drwcasebook/Documents/Documents/ILA%20Report%20on
%20Formation%20of%20Customary%20International%20Law.pdf. (March 01, 2018) . pp 20 
12 International Committee of the Red Cross, reports and Documents. A US government response to 
the International Committee of the Red Cross study Customary International Humanitarian Law. 
Accessible https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_866_bellinger.pdf. (April 03, 2018) pp 2-3 
8 
 
opinio juris, the second traditional condition for the existence of custom. 13 
 
The ICJ’s statute art 38 (1) (b) refers to international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law, as a second source of international law (art 38 (1) (a) refers to treaty law as 
primary source of international law). Custom, whose importance reflects the decentralized 
nature of the international system, involves two fundamental elements: the actual practice of 
states and the acceptance by states of that practice as law.14 
According to Professor Weil the acts accomplished by subjects of international law are 
so diverse in character that it is no simple matter for a jurist to determine what may be called 
the normativity threshold: i.e., the line of transition between the non-legal and the legal, 
between what does not constitute a norm and what does. At what point does a "nonbinding 
agreement" turn into an international agreement, a promise into a unilateral act, fact into 
custom? Of course, this problem of the transition from non-law to law occurs in all legal 
systems, in particular under the guise of the distinction between moral and legal obligation. But 
the multiplicity of the forms of action secreted by the needs of international intercourse has 
rendered it more acute in that field than in any other, since in the international order neither pre-
normative nor normative acts are as clearly differentiated in their effects.15 
 
International law is the aggregate of the legal norms governing international relations. 
This means that the concept of international law is defined by both its nature and its functions. 
Its nature is to be an "aggregate of the legal norms" that dictate what its subjects must do 
(prescriptive norms), must not do (prohibitive norms), or may do (permissive norms) and 
constitute for them a source of legal rights and obligations. Its functions lie in "governing 
international relations." International law is therefore at once a "normative order" and a "factor 
of social organization. These two facets are obviously interdependent. Thus, while the 
emergence of international law as a "normative order" is due to the need to fulfill certain 
functions, it will not be capable of actually fulfilling them unless it constitutes a normative order 
of good quality. In other words, the capacity of the international legal order to attain the 
objectives it was set up for will largely depend on the quality of its constituent norms. There 
                                                 
13 Weil, P. Towards Relative normativity in International law? American Journal of International Law 
, vol 77 (1983)Accessible 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ajil77&div=36&start_page=413&collection=jo
urnals&set_as_cursor=3&men_tab=srchresults. (March 20, 2018) pp 413-414, art 28 
14 Britannica Academic, Custom. Accessible 
https://academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/international-law/106320. (March 19, 2018) 
15 Op cit Weil, pp 428 
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can therefore be no indifference in regard to anything affecting international legal norms, since 
without norms of good quality international law would become a defective tool.16 
In this sense, international law is at its core a body of compulsory norms involving two 
or more states.   17  
The acts accomplished by subjects of international law are so diverse in character that 
it is no simple matter for a jurist to determine what may be called the normativity threshold: 
i.e., the line of transition between the no legal and the legal, between what does not constitute 
a norm and what does. At what point does a "nonbinding agreement" turn into an international 
agreement, a promise into a unilateral act, and fact into custom? Of course, this problem of the 
transition from non-law to law occurs in all legal systems, in particular under the guise of the 
distinction between moral and legal obligation. But the multiplicity of the forms of action 
secreted by the needs of international intercourse has rendered it more acute in that field than 
in any other, since in the international order neither pre-normative nor normative acts are as 
clearly differentiated in their effects.18 
 
There are three sources of international law- treaty law, customary law and general 
principle of law. Customary law is unwritten international law that develops over time and is 
based on state practice. Although unwritten, it binds all states, except those that fall into a very 
specific and narrow category of persistent objector. Treaties, by which states expressively agree 
to be bound in law, may be bilateral (two states) or multilateral (more than two parties) and 
treaty law may be coterminous with customary law in the sense that a treaty’s provisions simply 
reflect customary law, or have come to reflect customary law that has subsequently emerged. 
However, conceptually it is useful to think of treaty law as consisting of express agreements 
that either recognize customary norms or create new legal norms that render an act or failure to 
act unlawful for the parties to treaty. 19 
 
International law is typically described as prohibitory in nature: any activity that is not 
prohibited is generally permitted. This is known as Lotus principle from Permanent Court of 
international Justice Case 1927 France v. Turkey20. According to Schmitt et al, even when law 
                                                 
16 Op cit, Weil, P. Towards Relative normativity in International law? Pp 413-414  
17 Schmitt, M. et al. The Nature of International Law Cyber Norms. International Cyber Norms: legal, 
policy & Industry perspectives. NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn: 2016 pp 23-26 
18 Op cit Weil, p 415 art 5 
19 Op cit Schmitt, M. pp 26 
20 Permanent Court of International Law, France v. Turkey 1927 Lotus case judgement. Accessible 
https://web.archive.org/web/20101210073754/http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927/1
927.09.07_lotus.htm. (March 15, 2018) 
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does exist, it may prove lacking when meeting unanticipated circumstances and thus is 
occasionally breached as part of the process of creating a new norm. Indeed it is often said that 
customary law norms are made in the breach. If a state treats a customary norm as inconsistent 
with their need to ensure, they may begin to act contrary to the norm. Over time, their state 
practice could be viewed by other states as legal. Once the international law boundaries of 
conduct are demarcated domestic legal, political, ethical and other norms can operate to further 
restrict or require particular conduct. International law norms merely define the space within 
which states may engage in normative construction. Of course, states may act to transform these 
non-legal norms into those with legal authority by adopting a treaty incorporating them or 
engaging in state practice that crystallizes over time into customary law.21 
 
Permanent Court of International Justice, is today universally accepted as accurately 
setting forth the international law. Subparagraphs delineates the two secondary sources of law 
used to elucidate that law:  judicial decision and the work of distinguished scholars. It must be 
cautioned that secondary sources are not in themselves law. In particular and unlike the practice 
in many domestic jurisdictions, the decisions of tribunals are binding on the parties before the 
court,22  a fact codified in Article 59 of the Statue. Nevertheless, such decisions and scholarly 
works are highly persuasive in interpreting treaty provisions and identify customary law.  Codes 
of conducts or statements of best practice are not binding on states in the same manner as legal 
norms, and their violation does not involve the same remedies. While the sanctioning of 
violations of international legal norms is complicated by the general absence of a compulsory 
enforcement mechanism, states are nevertheless significantly more reluctant to breach legal, as 
opposed to other, types of norms. Traditionally norms of international law were viewed as 
binding only on states. It was left to individual states to address the conduct of individuals and 
organisations that fell under their personal jurisdiction when engaged in activities that were 
within their subject matter competency. Although international law continues to primarily 
govern international relations between states, in the last century it has increasingly come to 
address individual conduct. Classic examples include international legal norms that permit 
universal jurisdiction over certain acts such as war crimes. To amount to international law all 
such norms must be agreed to by multiple states, either through treaty or the development of 
customary law. The expression ‘customary international law’ concerns, on the one hand, the 
process through which certain rules of international law are formed, and, on the other, the rules 
                                                 
21 Op cit, Schmitt et al, pp 27 
22 Statue of ICJ art 59 states the decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties 
and in respect of that particular case. 
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formed through such a process. While these rules are not necessarily general in scope, all 
existing general rules of international law are customary. Even though language is necessary to 
communicate their content, expression through language is not an indispensable element of 
customary international law rules. The irrelevance of linguistic expression excludes 
interpretation as a necessary operation in order to apply them. Recently customary rules have 
developed in connection with written texts, whose interpretation may be relevant for 
determining the existence and contents of these rules. As we will see, contemporary customary 
international law, although unwritten, is increasingly characterized by the strict relationship 
between it and written texts. Such texts may be the point of departure for the formation of a 
customary rule, and sometimes (in the case of widely ratified conventions) the basis for stating 
the existence of certain customary law rules. The essential characteristic which customary 
international law rules have in common is the way they have come into existence and the way 
their existence may be determined. While customary international rules may give rise to the 
same problems as other categories of rules—such as: Does the rule apply to certain facts? What 
is its relationship with other categories of rules?—the preliminary question of their existence is 
more complex than that, for instance, of the existence of a treaty rule, as it is necessary to 
ascertain whether, at the relevant time, the conditions for its existence are satisfied. In this way, 
consideration of the customary international law process becomes an indispensable element for 
the application of customary international law rules. Moreover, in order to apply a customary 
rule, it is not sufficient that it has come into existence: it must exist at the relevant time, as the 
process through which customary rules are modified or extinguished is the same as that through 
which they come into being.23 
 
Before the twentieth century, CIL was the principal form of international law. It was often 
referred to as part of the "law of nations," a category that included both public international law 
(rights and duties between nations) and private international law (rules governing private 
international relationships and disputes, such as conflict-of-law principles, rules for 
enforcement of foreign judgments, and the "law merchant"). Issues regulated by the public law 
component of the law of nations included, for example, rights on the seas, conduct during 
wartime, and diplomatic immunity.24 There has since been a proliferation of treaties, both in 
                                                 
23 Max Plank Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Customary International Law. Accessible 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1393?rskey=z7TKv4&result=1&prd=EPIL. (Feb 28, 2018)  
24 Bradley, C. A et al. Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 Yale Law Journal 202, 2010. 
Accessible 
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quantity and range of subject matter, especially after the establishment of the United Nations 
system at the end of World War II. As a result, most of the major issue areas that were 
historically covered by CIL are now covered, to one degree or another, by treaties. For example, 
the Law of the Sea Convention addresses rights on the seas," the Geneva Conventions address 
conduct during wartime,' and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations addresses 
diplomatic immunity." Treaties also address numerous issues that were not historically 
regulated (at least extensively) by international law, including environmental conservation, the 
protection of human rights, and the prosecution of international crimes. CIL nevertheless 
continues to play an important role in international law and adjudication, regulating both within 
the gaps of treaties as well as the conduct of nonparties to the treaties." In addition, some 
longstanding CIL issues (such as the immunity of heads of state and limits on the extraterritorial 
application of national law) are still not regulated by any comprehensive treaties. Finally, newly 
emergent issues will often lack a treaty regime for a time. A possible (although contested) 
current example is the lack of a treaty addressing the standards for detention and trial of 
terrorists engaged in an armed conflict with a nation-state." The standard definition of CIL is 
that it arises from the practices of nations followed out of a sense of legal obligation. Under this 
account, there are two elements to CIL: an objective state-practice element and a subjective 
sense-of legal-obligation (or opinio juris) element. This is the conventional definition, although 
some commentators have attempted to deemphasize the subjective element and others have 
attempted to deemphasize the state-practice element. 25 
 
Whatever the proper role of consent in international law, CIL (as it is currently 
conceived) is less consensual than treaty-based law. Treaties bind only nations that have 
affirmatively ratified them, and, as discussed, nations often have the ability to withdraw from 
treaties, albeit sometimes with a notice requirement. CIL, by contrast, binds new states 
regardless of their consent and binds existing states based merely on their silence. There is also 
no unilateral right of withdrawal. Jus cogens norms are even less consensual.26 
  
Customary international norms are unique as they are unwritten. In many fields as law 
of the sea, jus ad bellum, International Humanitarian Law, customary international law was 
historically predominant. Only 20th century did treaty law on the subject come into its own.  
                                                 
http://heinonline.org.ezproxy.utlib.ut.ee/HOL/Print?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/ylr120
&id=204. (March 19, 2018) .p 208  
25 Op cit Bradley, A. C et al p 209 
26 Op cit, Bradley, C. A et al. pp 202-275 
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Despite the proliferation of treaties in the last century customary law retains its significance. In 
great part, this is because most treaty regimes are not universal. As an example, neither USA 
nor Israel are party to the 1977 Additional Protocols, although both states have been involved 
in numerous conflicts since their adoption. To the extent that non-party states comply with the 
norms expressed in a treaty they do so only the basis that they reflect customary international 
law. Riles expressed in a treaty sometimes crystallize into customary law, even though they did 
not mirror a customary norm at the time of adoption.  The classic case is that the regulations 
annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV. When a particular point encompassed in the 
material of an agreement is not directly addressed, any existing customary law will govern the 
matter. Although unwritten customary law is not a binding on states as treaty law.  
As noted by the ICJ in the Asylum case: 
 
“The Party which relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this custom is 
established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Party. The 
Colombian Government must prove that the rule invoked by it is in accordance with a 
constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in question, and that this usage is the 
expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on 
the territorial State. This follows from Article 38 of the Statute of the Court, which refers 
to international custom "as evidence of a general practice accepted as law". 27 
 
According to Instrument Choice Perspective sometimes custom functions as a 
complement to treaties or soft law, as the literatures on legalization and instrument choice at 
times suggest. But, the distinctive (and less malleable) characteristics of custom, as compared 
to soft law and treaties, create continuing incentives for states to choose custom over the other 
legal instruments if doing so advances their respective national interests or shapes the content, 
scope, or application of international rules in ways that favor them. If this account is correct, 
the demand for custom will not be affected by whether a particular subject area becomes more 
heavily populated by treaties and/or soft law. States dissatisfied with the content of non-binding 
norms or treaty provisions might, for example, attempt to develop alternative customary rules 
with different substantive obligations. Or states might agree with the substance of a treaty or 
soft law, but turn to custom because of its distinctive design features, such as its preclusion of 
                                                 
27 Asylum case, Columbia v. Peru, ICJ judgement 20 Nov. 1950 p 14. Accessible http://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/7/007-19501120-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf. (March 15, 2018) 
14 
 
the ability to “opt-out” by non-ratifications, treaty withdrawals, or reservations. 28 States can 
generate custom in a range of potentially important context. Customs form primary in three 
situations; 
 
1. When all states benefit from a customary rule with low distribution cost.  
2. When powerful nations impose a custom on weaker states and 
3. When states seek to entrench shared normative values. Outside of those three domain less 
likely a new custom forms. 
Custom remains relevant even in the age of soft law and treaties. For example states may use 
custom to unbundle certain negotiated aspects of multilateral conventions, especially those that 
preclude reservations. 29  
 
In 2000 the International Law association adopted an extensive statement of principles 
concerning the formation of International Law Commission (ILC) after years of work by special 
committee. Although rightly regarded as a major contribution the statement provoked 
controversy by de-emphasizing the opinion juris requirement for CIL.  Debate about the 
methodology for determining CIL rules also emerged in the wake of a wildly discussed study 
in 2005 by the International Committee of the Red Cross on customary international 
humanitarian law. In 2012 the International Law Commission30 began to address one of the last 
major uncodified areas of public international law: how norms of customary law (CIL) are to 
be identified.31 Project seeks to explain how to identify rules of customary international law 
and their content in order to assist no specialists in international law. 32 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Hefner, R. L et al. Customary International Law: An Instrument Choice Perspective. Michigan Journal 
of International Law. Volume 37, Issue 4, 2016. Accessible 
https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.ee/&httpsredir=1&a
rticle=1340&context=mjil. (March 02, 2018) pp 596-597 
29 Op cit Helfner pp 568 
30 International Law Commission. Summaries of the Work of the International Law Commission. 
Accessible http://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_13.shtml. (Feb 28, 2018) 
31 Fox, H,G. Security Council Resolutions as Evidence of Customary International Law. EJIL:Talk! 
Accessible https://www.ejiltalk.org/security-council-resolutions-as-evidence-of-customary-
international-law/. (March 01, 2018) 
32 Op  cit Bradley pp 2-3 
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1.1 General customary law 
 
Customary rules are the result of a process—whose character has been qualified by a 
number of authors as ‘mysterious’—through which elements of fact, empirically verifiable, 
acquire a legal character thus creating rights and obligations for the subjects of international 
law. One of the main objects of contention concerns what it is that makes factual elements 
legally binding in international law. This is the problem of the basis of customary international 
law. A central question is whether there is a rule that makes customary rules binding, and, if it 
exists, what its content is. The views of scholars on the subject may be grouped in two 
categories, depending on whether such rule is deemed to exist. The position that considers that 
such a rule exists, which may be indicated as positivist, includes one group which deems that 
custom is not essentially different from agreements: it is a kind of tacit, and sometimes 
presumptive, agreement. Consequently, the rule on which the binding character of customary 
rules depends is pacta sunt servanda, the very rule on which the binding character of 
agreements depends. Other positivist authors (Legal Positivism) criticize the assimilation of 
customary rules with treaty rules as being a fiction. They state that customary rules are different 
from treaty rules and seek a rule of a level higher than customary rules as a basis for the binding 
character of these rules. This rule has a peculiar nature, as it is a ‘hypothetical’ rule, the 
hypothesis upon which the system is based.  ‘Spontaneous law’ theory - Customary rules 
emerge ‘spontaneously’ from the international community -  has been developed in particular 
by Italian authors of the mid-20th century (M Giuliano, R Ago, G Barile), and is followed by 
well-known scholars such as P Reuter and HLA Hart. In this theory existence of rules depends 
on whether it can be empirically ascertained that they are considered as binding by the members 
of the international community and whether they function as such in the relationships between 
these members. Closely connected with the question of the basis of customary international law 
is the question of which facts are to be ascertained empirically in order to determine that a 
customary international rule has come into existence. A key aspect of this question is whether 
these facts are produced by the will of States or through an involuntary process. While the latter 
question is easily answered if the view that the basis of customary international law is the pacta 
sunt servanda rule is accepted, as customary rules would be produced in the same way as treaty 
rules, the question is more difficult if one starts from the spontaneous law approaches. 
According to these approaches, the customary process is not a voluntary one. What counts is 
that, as mentioned, certain facts should be empirically determined. The prevailing view is that 
these facts are to be grouped in two elements, an objective one, the repeated behavior of States 
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(diuturnitas), and a subjective one, the belief that such behavior depends on a legal obligation 
(opinio iuris sive necessitatis). While the opinio iuris is by definition an opinion, a conviction, 
a belief, and thus does not depend on the will of States, the conduct of States is always the 
product of their will. What makes the discussion complex is that in willing to behave in a certain 
manner States may or may not be willfully pursuing the objective of contributing to the creation, 
to the modifications or to the termination of a customary rule. This applies also to the 
expressions of views as to whether certain behaviors are legally obligatory or as to whether a 
certain rule of customary law exists: these may be real expressions of belief—manifestations 
of opinio iuris—or acts, corresponding or not to true belief, voluntarily made with the purpose 
of influencing the formation, the modification or the termination of a customary rule. These 
latter expressions of views are objective facts rather than subjective beliefs. The difficulty of 
distinguishing behaviors and expressions of views that are, or are not, made with the will of 
influencing the customary process, explain why in modern international law, together with the 
prevailing theory of the two elements of customary law, theories are often held supporting the 
view that only the objective, or only the subjective element, is decisive for the existence of a 
rule of customary international law and views that consider decisive only material facts and 
others that consider that manifestations of opinion are relevant. 33 
 
International community sees international custom as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law. 34   The actual practice of states (termed the “material fact”) covers various 
elements, including the duration, consistency, repetition, and generality of a particular kind of 
behavior by states. All such elements are relevant in determining whether a practice may form 
the basis of a binding international custom. The ICJ has required that practices amount to a 
“constant and uniform usage” or be “extensive and virtually uniform” to be considered binding. 
Although all states may contribute to the development of a new or modified custom, they are 
not all equal in the process. The major states generally possess a greater significance in the 
establishment of customs. For example, during the 1960s the United States and the Soviet Union 
played a far more crucial role in the development of customs relating to space law than did the 
states that had little or no practice in this area.35 
 
 
                                                 
33 Op cit Max Plank, customary international law 
34 Statue of the International Court of Justice, art 38, para 1(b) 
35 Op cit, Britannica Academic, custom 
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Customary international law, it is generally agreed, finds its source in the widespread consistent 
practice of states. International custom is seen as a source of international law because the 
thought is that if states act in a certain consistent manner, then such states may be acting in such 
a manner because they have a sense of legal obligation – dubbed opinio juris.  
 
1.1.1 State practice 
 
The 1st prong the test state practice includes both physical and verbal acts of state. To 
qualify as state practice the conduct in question must generally occur over an extended period 
of time. The classic illustration is the 1900 US Supreme Court case the Paquete Habana36 in 
which the court looked into the practice of numerous countries over a period measured in 
centuries to conclude that fishing vessels were exempt from capture by belligerents during an 
armed conflict.  This temporal condition has deteriorated over time. As an example in the North 
Sea Continental Self case37, the ICJ in dealing with the customary law of the sea   held that the 
passage of only a short time is not necessarily a bar…if state practice including that of states 
whose interests are specially affected is both extensive and virtually uniform. Perhaps the best 
illustration of the weakening of the requirement of long-term practice is the development of 
customary space law, an example suggest that the relative novelty of cyber operations does not 
necessarily preclude the rapid emergence of cyber specific customary international law. The 
state practice essential to establishing customary law must, even if of limited duration, be 
consistent. When there are significant deviations from a practice by states, which may include 
both engaging in an activity and refraining from one, a customary norm cannot materialize. 
Although minor infrequent inconsistencies do not constitute a bar to such emergence, repeated 
inconsistencies generally have to be characterized by other states as violations of the norm in 
question before a customary norm can be said to exist. For instance, it is clear that the 
prohibition on the use of force set out in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter constitutes a customary 
norm; yet states have historically engaged in the use of force and continue to do so today. The 
saving factor is that when they do, their conduct is, absent the justification of self-defense, 
typically styled by other states as wrongful. 38 
 
 There is no set formula as to the number of states that must engage in a practice  
                                                 
36 The Paquere Habana 175 U.S 677 US Supreme Court, 1900. The primary holding is: Customary 
international law is an accepted part of American law and can be applied by federal courts.  
37 North Sea Continental Shelf case, ICJ judgement 20 Feb. 1969. 
38 Op cit Schmitt et al. pp 39-41 
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before a norm crystallizes, although the greater the density of practice, the more convincing the 
argument that crystallization has occurred. Of particular importance is the diversity of the states 
involved on issues such as their geopolitics and legal systems, and the fact that ‘specially 
affected states’ have engaged in the practice or expressed their view of such practice when 
engaged in by other states. A specially affected state is one upon which the norm will operate 
with particular resonance. As an example, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
has opined that ‘specially affected states’ with respect to the legality of weapons include ‘those 
identified as having been in the process of developing such weapons’. In cyberspace, the US 
would qualify as a ‘specially affected state’ in light of its centrality to cyber activities and its 
development of military capacity in the field. The term ‘opinio juris’ refers to the requirement 
that a state engage in a practice, or refrain from it, out of a sense of legal obligation. In other 
words, the state must believe that its actions are required or prohibited by international law. It 
is often the case that a state’s behavior is motivated by other factors, such as policy, security, 
operational, economic and even moral considerations. For instance, Estonia actively seeks to 
maintain a clean cyber environment. It does so, not because it believes that the international 
legal requirement of ‘due diligence’ requires such measures, but rather for cyber security 
reasons such as to prevent the establishment and use of botets in the country. Such practices 
have no bearing on the creation of a customary law norm.39 
 
 The fact that various norms converge to govern state conduct makes it necessary to 
deconstruct state practice to determine whether a state is acting out of a sense of legal obligation 
or is instead motivated by ethical or policy concerns. Obviously, it is often difficult to ascertain 
the rationale underlying a particular practice; care must be taken in drawing inferences as to  
opinio juris based solely on the existence of state practice. For instance, the ICRC cited many 
military manuals as evidence of opinio juris in its 2005 Customary International Humanitarian 
Law study. In response, the US objected that the provisions found in military manuals were 
often as much the product of operational and policy choice as legal obligation. A similar 
criticism frequently attends the citation of UN General Assembly resolutions as support for the 
existence of a customary norm, because states can vote in favor of such legally non-binding 
instruments for purely political reasons. The point is that when the basis for a practice or 
assertion is unclear, it does not comprise the requisite opinio juris. Despite this difficulty, states 
do engage in conduct and issue statements that clearly indicate their characterization of certain 
practices as required (or not) by customary international law. As an example, although the US 
                                                 
39 Op cit Schmitt, pp 40-41 
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is a party to neither the Law of the Sea Convention nor Additional Protocol I, it often confirms 
that it views certain provisions of those instruments as reflective of customary international 
law. Once a customary norm has emerged, it is applicable to all states, including those that did 
not participate in the practice that led to its crystallization. Such norms are even binding on 
states that are created after the customary norm has developed. However, there are a number of 
exceptions to this general principle. In particular, a state may ‘persistently object’ to the norm’s 
formation as it is emerging. If the norm nevertheless emerges, the persistent objector is arguably 
not bound by it. In this regard, the role of ‘specially affected states’ is paramount. It would be 
very unlikely that a customary norm could emerge over the objection of such a state. For 
example, given the military wherewithal of the US, and its frequent involvement in armed 
conflicts, it would be difficult for an IHL cyber norm to materialize in the face of a US objection 
thereto. Fortunately, assertions of persistent objection are infrequent; rather, disagreement 
regarding customary norms typically surrounds the scope of a rule, not its existence. In certain 
limited circumstances, a customary norm may be regional or even local in character. To 
illustrate, in the Asylum case, the ICJ found that a regional customary norm applied in Latin 
America, whereas in the Rights of Passage it determined that another existed between two states 
with respect to passage across India to Portuguese enclaves in that state. It is foreseeable that 
regional norms might develop for cyber activities, particularly where states of a region are 
similarly situated in that regard, as in the case of Europe. 40 
 
1.1.2 Challenges to identify state practice 
 
According to UN General Assembly document from International Law Commission on 
Identification of customary international law states that, certain categories of evidence are much 
harder to find than others and some may legitimately need to remain confidential. First, while 
the legislative and judicial practice of States is widely available, accounts of the executive 
conduct of States are much more difficult to ascertain and evaluate. For instance, diplomatic 
correspondence may be classified as confidential. Another example is executive conduct in the 
field of the law of armed conflict. While some States publish their military manuals, many 
others do not; more generally, executive conduct “on the ground”, such as military conduct, is 
not always reported, or may be reported by news services, the accuracy of which might be 
difficult to evaluate. In addition, detailed reports of such conduct may exist but remain 
confidential: the International Committee of the Red Cross regularly collects information about 
                                                 
40 Op cit Schmitt, pp 42-43 
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the practice of States while helping Governments in fulfilling their legal obligations, but not all 
such information is made public; indeed, confidential reports sent to the attention of 
Governments are an important part of the work of the International Committee of the Red 
 Cross. 41 The arbitral tribunals are another category of sources that us not uniformly available. 
a number of arbitral proceedings remain confidential and are never reported. not all the 
pleadings of States before international courts and tribunals, including arbitral tribunals, are 
publicly available. In relation to international organizations, while it is generally possible to 
find online versions of official documents and records of meetings, many documents that 
are potentially relevant as evidence of customary international law are never issued as official 
documents or otherwise remain confidential. For example, the World Bank does not publish the 
verbatim or summary records of meetings in which representatives of States participate, nor 
does it publish the video or audio recordings of such meetings, or the diplomatic 
correspondence addressed to or received from States. In addition, the World Bank collects 
information on the conduct of States in relation to its mandate and activity, but does not publish 
such information. In general, as noted above, the legal opinions of counsel of international 
organizations are often unpublished and some of the diplomatic correspondence addressed to 
or from States may only be made available after a certain number of years in the archives of  
the international organization.42 
 
1.1.3 Opinio juris 
 
 After a practice has been established, a second element converts a mere usage into a 
binding custom—the practice must be accepted as opinio juris sive necessitatis (Latin: “opinion 
that an act is necessary by rule of law”).  If enough states act in such consistent manner, out of 
a sense of legal obligation, for a long enough period of time, a new rule of international law is 
created. There can also exist regional customary law which is binding on a group of nation 
states in a particular region, but not upon the international system as a whole as stated in see 
Asylum case  (Columbia v. Peru) [1950] ICJ Rep 266. The system can thus be thought of as 
circular, in that states are in effect creating a rule, through acting in conformity with such rule 
over a period of time, because they feel they are legally obligated to do so. What of the situation, 
however, when one has an inconsistency between state practice and opinio juris (on the part of 
one or a group of states)? According to the International Court of Justice, in such situations 
                                                 
41 UN GA Document from International Law Commission on Identification of customary International 
law, Jan 12, 2018. Accessile http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/710. (April 03, 2018) pp 27-28 
42 Op cit UN GA document pp 28-29 
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state conduct which runs counter to the rule should be viewed as a violation of such rule, not as 
evidence that the state does not intend to recognize it: as stated in  Military and Paramilitary 
Activities case (Nicaragua v. US)[1986] ICJ Rep 14, at 98. Customary international law 
depends upon the consent of nation states, which can be either explicit or implicit. if a rule of 
customary international law is emerging and a nation state remains silent, then this can be seen 
as giving implicit consent that the nation state will be bound by the new customary rule: as 
stated in Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), at sect. 
102 comment d. Thus, if in theory a nation state does not wish to be bound by a new rule of 
customary international law, then it can, in theory, vocally object and announce that it does not 
view itself as bound. New nations, however, it is generally held, cannot choose between the 
various rules of customary international law – they are bound by all of the accepted customary 
rules (at the point of independence). Opinio juris plays a key role in elevating a regular 
customary international law norm into a jus cogens norm, for only when the majority of states 
in the international system believe that such a norm cannot be persistently objected to, or 
contracted out of, does a regular customary norm achieve elevation to a jus cogens norm. Opinio 
juris plays a key role in elevating a regular customary international  law norm into a  jus cogens 
norm, for only when the majority of states in the international system believe that such a norm 
cannot be persistently objected to, or contracted out of, does a regular customary norm achieve 
elevation to a jus cogens norm.  Running parallel to jus cogens norms are what are called 
obligations erga omnes .Obligations erga omnes are obligations considered so vital and 
important within the  international system (usually in the form of jus cogens norms) that any 
state (whether directly affected or not) may sue another state in order to compel the obligation 
to be met. 43 
 
Development within the International Court of Justice- the past few decades have seen a 
concerted  movement in legal scholarship which has sought to redefine the sources of custom- 
ary international law away from a blanket reliance on these two sources. At its most extreme, 
this scholarship argues that international treaties, especially those encompassing human rights 
obligations, actually generate international legal norms, because such conventions are 
inevitably not simply the codification of existing legal norms but rather the creation of new 
ones. Relying, at times, on findings from the International Court of Justice, a framework has 
been presented by this scholarship which seeks to modify the role of prolonged state practice 
and opinio juris in the process of transforming conventional or treaty-based international law 
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(binding only on the state signatories) into customary international law (binding on all) This  
non-traditional scholarship presents a framework which insists that the signing of a convention 
or treaty by a wide group of countries is, in and of itself, evidence of the creation of new 
customary legal norms. Although this non-traditional scholarship has ultimately been 
successful in redefining the sources of customary international law, such a move has not been 
without its critics.44 
 
International conventions, it is argued, actually generate international legal norms ie prohibition 
of genocide. Real insight into what the treaty drafters intended is missing, because any good 
negotiator would merely contend that what was being drafted was merely a ‘restatement of the 
customary legal rule’, rather than an intent towards building a new norm of international 
 law. 45 
 
Reinterpreting the roles of state practice and opinion juris- Reviewing the role of state 
practice in customary norm formation, certain strands of the non-traditional scholarship have 
posited that, far from being a slow moving cautious process, the formation of customary 
international law through state practice and opinio jurisis a dynamic and fast paced process – 
with the theoretical possibility of occurring nearly overnight. The key stressed by this 
scholarship is that opinio juris alone, rather than coupled with consistent state practice, 
formulates the foundational source of customary international law. State practice, if it has any 
role at all to play, is a secondary factor in customary international norm formation in that it can 
be thought of as composed of a general ‘communal’ acceptance (on the part of the community 
of states in the international system as a whole) rather than the expressed will of individual 
states. The non-traditional scholarship and its move towards reinterpreting the role of state  
practice and opinio juris in the formation of customary international law have provoked a series 
of push-backs by legal scholars who disagree heavily with its methods and conclusions. At their 
core, these push-backs argue that the reinterpretation of customary international law advocated 
by the non-traditional scholarship, one which, as has been seen, envisages the transformation 
of conventional international law into customary international law as a seamless process and 
minimizes the role of state practice as a key component in customary international law 
formation, poses a danger to the entire concept of customary international law. 46 
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45 Op cit Baker, B.R pp 181 
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Resolutions of international organizations- resolutions of international bodies such as 
the UN should be seen as possible starting points in the development of custom, not norm-
generating acts in and of themselves. Many of the resolutions the UN General Assembly votes 
upon are aspirational in nature and are not intended to be embraced fully and unconditionally 
by those states voting for them. Given this fact, the act of using state practice and opinio juris 
together as the yardsticks of custom formation gains all the more importance, for only then can 
aspirational or symbolic acts be separated from those intended to be law-making – in the 
absence of state practice, these scholars claim, anything labelled as a customary norm of 
international law lacks legitimacy. Given this, although the traditional reliance on state practice 
and opinio juris in tandem may be far from perfect, these scholars see no other alternative which 
would preserve the consensual nature of international law.47 
 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ stated that the practice in question must 
have “occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal 
obligation is involved. “Once a practice becomes a custom, all states in the international 
community are bound by it whether or not individual states have expressly consented—except 
in cases where a state has objected from the start of the custom, a stringent test to demonstrate.  
 
The Lotus case on ICJ in 1927 the first and foremost restriction imposed by international 
law upon a State is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it may not 
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is 
certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a 
permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention. 48  
 
 
1.2 Elements of Customary international law 
 
Sovereignty is the core principal of international law and international relations.  
The sovereignty refers to the supreme authority of every state within its territory. In the Island 
of Palmas arbitral award of 1928 stated: Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies 
                                                 
47 Op cit, Baker, pp 183-184 
48 Lotus case ICJ France vs Turkish Republic, 1927, judgement no 10. Accessible http://www.icj-
cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-justice/serie_A/A_10/30_Lotus_Arret.pdf. Pp 18-
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independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, 
to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state.49   
 
A number of principles and rules of conventional and customary international law derive from 
the general principle of sovereignty. Jurisdiction, obligation to respect certain immunities of 
other states. International Court of Justice has held that principle of respect for State sovereignty 
is closely linked with the principle of the prohibition of the use of force50 and non-intervention. 
51 ICJ court judgement on Nicaragua case states as follows: The Court should now mention the 
principle of respect for State sovereignty, which in international law is of course closely linked 
with the principles of the prohibition of the use of force and of non-intervention. The basic legal 
concept of State sovereignty in customary international law, expressed in, inter alia, Article 2. 
Paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, extends to the internal waters and territorial sea of 
every State and to the air space above its territory. As to superjacent air space, the 1944 Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (Art. 1) reproduces the established principle of the 
complete and exclusive sovereignty of a State over the air space above its territory. That 
convention, in conjunction with the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea, further 
specifies that the sovereignty of the coastal State extends to the territorial sea and to the air 
space above it, as does the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea adopted on 10 
December 1982. The Court has no doubt that these prescriptions of treaty-law merely respond 
to firmly established and longstanding tenets of customary international law. 52 
 
 Internal sovereignty has two international legal consequences. First, the infrastructure 
and activities are subject to domestic legal and regulatory control by the State. State may 
promulgate and enforce domestic laws and regulations regarding them.  Second, the States 
sovereignty over its territory affords it the right under international law to protect infrastructure 
and activity that is located in, or takes place on, its territory. 53 
 
State practice and expressions of opinio juris are obligatory elements of any claim that 
an obligation to respect sovereignty is legally binding in customary international law. In this 
regard, it must be noted that States sometimes act in ways that affect, but do not violate, the 
                                                 
49 Permanent Court of Arbitration. The Island of Palmas Case United States of America v. The 
Netherlands. April 4, 1928, page 7. 
50 ICJ, judgement on the case of Nicaragua v. United States of America. June 27, 1986, para 212.   
51 Op cit, Tallinn Manual 2.0 pp 11-12 
52 Op cit Nucaragua case para 212. 
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exercise of sovereign rights of other States, such as imposing sanctions that impact another 
State’s domestic economic activities. Additionally, the term “sovereignty” frequently appears 
in political statements without necessarily carrying legal weight. Thus, it is essential to be 
sensitive to customary law’s formal components of State practice and opinion juris when 
examining what States do, how they react to actions by other States, and what their officials say 
publicly. The examples that follow have been carefully selected as illustrations of the way in 
which States treat the issue of sovereignty in international law, rather than as an international 
relations concept. States have characterized a plethora of incidents as violations of their 
territorial sovereignty. It must be cautioned that some involved the armed forces and therefore 
may also have implicated the prohibitions of the use of force or coercive intervention. The fact 
that States at times chose to discuss an incident as a breach of their territorial in violability when 
the actions might also have crossed the use-of-force or coercive-intervention thresholds 
demonstrates that States consider the former to be a primary rule distinct from other primary 
rules that are based in the principle of sovereignty. Unconsented-to aerial intrusions have long 
been considered a violation of the subjacent State’s territorial sovereignty. Noteworthy in this 
regard is the incident involving the downing of an unarmed American U-2 reconnaissance 
aircraft by the Soviet Union and the capture of its pilot in 1960.The United States did not protest 
the shoot-down. This reaction contrasts sharply with U.S. condemnation of the downing of an 
RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft by Soviet fighters and the imprisonment of its crew the same 
year. The difference can only be explained by virtue of the locations of the aircraft at the time 
of the shoot-downs, since both incidents involved military aircraft performing similar missions 
in the same year. In the case of the U-2, the aircraft was in Soviet national airspace, which both 
sides appeared to acknowledge was subject to Soviet sovereignty. By contrast, the RB-47 was 
flying in what the United States characterized as international airspace above the high seas. 
Accordingly, while the former involved a violation of national airspace, and thereby the Soviet 
Union’s territorial sovereignty, the latter, at least in the U.S. view, did not.54 
 
According to Brian Lepard the traditional view of customary law has many benefits. It 
gives the customary law the rootedness that allows states expectations to converge around 
norms and puts states on fair notice about what is expected of them under those norms. The 
definition of opinion juris looks to the belief of states, not those of scholars, nongovernmental 
organizations or judges. Thus, the focus is on what states believe should be the rules and not on 
the wishful thinking of others.  The definition of ICL is the requirement that states generally 
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believe that a given rule is desirable.  There must be minimum of majority support among states 
for a rule to be created or changed. This constitutes the consistent or widespread practice and 
opinion juris among states. This requirement prevents a minority of states from changing an 
established rule. States generally believe that the rule would be desirable to implement now or 
in the near future. It helps to distinguish lex lata from lex ferenda. States are subject to the rule 
now or soon. States must be willing to abide by it in the present. This is important qualification 
that may eliminate many aspirational norms from recognition as new customary law. States 
must believe that it is desirable to implement an “authoritative “legal rule.  By this states limit 
their own decision making is some way. 55 
 
1.2.1 Universality principle 
 
According to the familiar classic doctrine expressed in the Lotus Judgment, the source and 
test of a rule's opposability to a given state lie in that state's intention, as "expressed in 
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law."  Where 
conventional rules are concerned, the formality that presides over the conclusion of treaties and 
the principle of relative effect have enabled consensualism to be established without ambiguity 
or restriction: whether a state is committed by a treaty, and as from when, can be precisely 
ascertained. Matters have never been so clear as regards customary rules: it has always been 
difficult to determine whether a given state is bound by a rule of that kind and, if so, as from 
what moment. Nevertheless, thanks to a subtle interplay of tacit intention and non-opposability, 
acceptance never ceased to be a linchpin of the classic theory of custom. Hence it remained 
possible for any state unwilling to be bound by a norm, whether of customary or conventional 
origin, not to be bound by it, and for the states owing this or that international obligation to be 
as easily identifiable as, conversely, those possessing this or that right.  This situation is 
changing before our very eyes. Customary rules are now being described as general rules, and 
general rules are being analyzed as universal rules that are binding on all states without 
distinction, regardless of individual consent. As for that bastion of voluntarism, the 
conventional rules, a process is at work of absorbing them into the body of customary rules so 
as to subject them also to dilution.56 
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1.2.2 Special custom. Instant customary law 
 
Most of the discussion of customary international law focus on general custom and that 
applies worldwide. There can be CIL over smaller groups of states. This special or regional 
custom can exist among any number of states and potentially as few as two. If a subset of 
states meet the requirements of opinion juris and states practice (under the traditional 
definition of CIL) they are bound by a rule of special CIL. 57 
 
Committee on formation of Customary Law report found that, it might be argued that 
“instant customary law” is a contradiction in terms: the very concept of customary law normally 
requires a certain amount of practice and the lapse of at least some time. It might further be 
suggested that it is too easy for States to be able to make law without the necessary discipline 
of having to back up their words with deeds and test their aspirations against reality. Against 
the first of these objections - the contradiction inherent in the concept of “instant customary 
law” – the response might perhaps be made that this is simply a matter of terminology: the 
essence of customary law is that it is the unwritten manifestation of the will of the international 
community as a whole, and the fact that, in the past, this has usually occurred through the slow 
accretion of practice is not the essential feature: in short, one should not be unduly attached to 
labels. To the second objection it might perhaps be retorted that although it is easy to make 
statements on the spur of the moment, without any real intention to take them seriously or for 
them to have legal consequences, this is not invariably the case. A formal protest, for instance, 
is a verbal act, but must be taken seriously in the context of the formation of customary law; 
similarly, a formal prize de position by a government is not “mere talk”. All depends on the 
context. Accordingly, if governments choose to take their formal stance by means of a General 
Assembly resolution, there is no a priori reason why this should not count. To put it in another 
way, Section 18 has already stated that if it can be shown that a particular State or States have 
consented to a particular rule, at any rate those States will be bound by it. So it would seem 
that, if it can be shown that States as a whole really did consent to the rule set out in the 
resolution, they would be bound. The word “if” in the preceding sentence is important, however. 
Given that General Assembly resolutions are not, in principle, binding, something more is 
needed to establish this consent than a mere affirmative vote (or failure to oppose a resolution 
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adopted by consensus). It must also be recognized that not all authorities would accept that it is 
possible - even in exceptional cases - to dispense entirely with the need for at least some “real” 
practice.58 
 
According to Professor Weil there is a tendency to accept that a conventional provision can 
Stand in for the "general" practice, provided the clause in question has been adopted by a 
sufficient number of states, and in particular by the states whose interests can be regarded as 
the most nearly affected. In that way a treaty clause can give birth to "instant custom"-or so 
says the theory of quasiuniversal treaties: instruments embodying rules that, simply because 
they have been accepted qua conventional by a large number of states, are supposed to be 
binding qua customary on the others. This is no mere acceleration of the custom-formation 
process, but a veritable revolution in the theory of custom. To bolster this new view of things, 
reliance has been placed on that famous passage in the North Sea Continental Shelf Judgment 
where the Court, envisaging the transformation of a conventional rule into a rule of general 
international law, explains how "it might be that, even without the passage of any considerable 
period of time, a very widespread and representative participation in the convention might 
suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose interests were specially affected. 
'Since the Court indicates elsewhere in the same Judgment that "the passage of only a short 
period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary 
international law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule," nothing more 
was needed to prompt the conclusion that, in the eyes of the Court, a provision of treaty law 
adopted by enough sufficiently representative states could undergo instantaneous transmutation 
into a rule of customary international law. A few months later, in the Barcelona Traction case, 
the Court was explicitly to mention "international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal 
character.59 
 
A resolution by an international organization-may give birth to a norm of customary law, which, 
under the pretense of its generality, will be universally imposed on all states, including its 
opponents. This quite upsets the delicate balance on which the classic theory of custom was 
based, since opinio juris is by the same token dissolved in an ill-defined majority consent 
and more or less reduced to a vague "consensus."60 
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1.2.3 Persistent Objector Doctrine 
 
There is fairly widespread agreement that, even if there is a persistent objector rule in 
international law, it applies only when the customary rule is in the process of emerging. It does 
not, therefore, benefit States which came into existence only after the rule matured, or which 
became involved in the activity in question only at a later stage. Still less can it be invoked by 
those who existed at the time and were already engaged in the activity which is the subject of 
the rule, but failed to object at that stage. In other words, there is no "subsequent objector" 
rule.61 ICJ determined in its Asylum case62 in 1950 the persistent objector doctrine.  
 
1.3 Customary humanitarian international law  
 
This chapter analyzes two bodies of international law: that governing when states may resort 
to force (the jus ad bellum) and that applying during an armed conflict (international 
humanitarian law). Legal norms resides in treaties or are found in customary international law, 
the examination will address the sources of law first in the abstract and then in its context. 
General principle of law is the third source of international law and will be addressed as well. 
Any consideration of the international community’s legal architecture, including that applicable 
to activities necessarily begins with art. 38 of the Statue of the International Court of Justice. 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes 
as are submitted to it, shall apply- 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.  
  
At the outset of any consideration of the law of armed conflict, it must be emphasized that the 
right of the parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. 
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Despite the codification of much customary law into treaty form during the last one hundred 
years, four fundamental principles still underlie the law of armed conflict. These are 
military necessity, humanity, distinction, and proportionality. The law of armed conflict is 
intended to minimize the suffering caused by armed conflict rather than impede military 
efficiency.63 
 
1.3.1 Prohibition to use of force 
 
Prohibition to use of force- jus ad bellum, deals with the prohibition of the use of force 
in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and customary law, as well as the law of self-
defense set forth in Article 51 and its customary law counterparts.  
United Nations Charter article 51 allows states to use force in self-defense in situations 
amounting to an armed attack. As a general matter (the precise threshold is by no means settled) 
such operations must result in the destruction of property or injury to persons before qualifying 
as an attack that opens the door to a forceful response. In International Humanitarian law use 
of word war is historically term, that no longer enjoys the normative meaning associated with 
it for centuries when the fact that states were at war or had engaged in an act of war meant that 
certain bodies of law, such as the law of war and neutrality law, applied.  Since the mid-
twentieth century the term has been obsolete in international law. It was intentionally discarded 
by the international community in lieu of armed conflict in the four Geneva Conventions. This 
was done to emphasize that international humanitarian law applies irrespective of declaration 
of war or other legalistic formalities. The determination that states were at war involved in an 
armed conflict, would be factual. It is clear that when cyber operations accompany kinetic 
hostilities qualifying as armed attack taking place in Syria, International Humanitarian Law 
applies fully to all cyber operations that have nexus to the conflict, whether they are launched 
by state, non-state groups or individual hackers. In the same way that International 
Humanitarian Law prohibits injurious or destructive kinetic attacks against civilians and 
civilian objects, it likewise prohibits cyber-attacks against them having the same effect. 64  
 
Armed attack is the legal term of the art in the jus ad bellum and in International 
Humanitarian Law as well. The term does not simply refer to military operations directed by 
one belligerent against another during an armed conflict. Rather it is defined in Article 49 of 
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Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions65  as acts of violence against the adversary, 
weather in offence or in defense. The definition of an attack lies at the core on International 
Humanitarian Law, because many of its prohibitions are framed in terms of prohibition of 
attacks, the paradigmatic examples being those on directing attacks against civilians and 
civilian objects.   66 
 
1.4 New theories about customary international law and its elements 
 
According to Professor Baker67 two long-established sources of customary international 
law have been profoundly challenged in the past few decades. These two elements, the 
consistent practice of states, coupled with the determination (by the practicing state) that such 
practice is being undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation (labelled opinio juris), are no 
longer held in the high regard they once were. Indeed, since the 1970s, a wide range of newer 
non-traditional scholarship has emerged arguing against a strict adherence to state practice and 
opinio juris in determining customary international law and advocating instead a more relaxed 
interpretive approach. Within this vein, other scholars have gone further, arguing that widely 
ratified multilateral conventions or treaties which have established human rights prohibitions 
against genocide, torture, and slavery actually form confirmation of customary international 
law binding upon all states, not just the signatories.68 More traditional-minded scholars have 
castigated its seeming attempt to create shortcuts to the generation of international norms.   
 
According to one of the more prominent authors of this push-back, Professor Prosper 
Weil69 the purpose of international law throughout the centuries has never been to better 
mankind, but rather has been to ensure a set of universally recognized and agreed upon rules 
which allow mankind to live in relative peace and order.  Given this, the international legal 
system is always looking to ensure that its power and function are universally accepted and 
applicable, rather than hierarchical. Such a system is, argues Weil, by necessity all that 
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international law can ever hope to achieve whilst still maintaining universal acceptability. In 
Weil’s view, by now seeking to create a pre-eminence or hierarchy of obligations based on their 
content rather than on how they are created (the process), the non-traditional scholarship and 
its adherents are exhibiting a complete lack of understanding for what international law is.70 
 
 According to Brian D. Lepard a number of principles merit the status of “fundamental 
ethical principal” that are logically related to the principal of unity in diversity. This includes 
principle of human dignity and human rights, significant state autonomy, trust theory of 
government, punishment of criminals, limited state sovereignty, the right to freedom of moral 
choice, state duty to honor treaties. These are ethical principles, not norms of international law. 
Those principals may be relevant in determining whether or not particular norm of customary 
law should be recognized. 71 This reformulation of opinion juris gives a dynamic quality and 
revision or terminology of existing ones, without any false beliefs on the part of state. Practical 
impact on judicial or governmental decision making of the current conception of opinion juris 
is difficult to gauge, the is no doubt that at the margins a requirement that states believe a norm 
already to be the law can be disincentive to the recognition of the new or modified law. This 
new concept of opinion juris removes this barrier to dynamism in the evolution of customary 
law.72  
 
 Other scholars have suggested to modify the traditional way of definition of opinion 
juris. According to Curtis Bradley the rule of customary international law “can be recognized 
when it is evident- from state practice, statements, and other evidence- that the rule is something 
that the relevant community of states wishes to have as a binding norm forwards and that it is 
socially and morally desirable”73. The opinion juris is the center of CIL not state practice. The 
consistent state practice is the evidence of opinion juris but not an essential requirement in its 
own right for every type of norm. Different types of norms are needed to different types of 
problems rather than adopting “a one size fits all” approach. 74 
 
Customary international law is legally binding and soft law norms are not. But there are 
other differences as well. Soft law is easier and faster to create and modify than custom, making 
it useful for situations of uncertainty and experimentation where flexibility is prized. Whether 
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states can alter an existing customary rule without violating it is a question that has long 
bedeviled scholars. Deviating from soft law incurs no international legal responsibility and no 
(or at least lower) political and reputational costs, neatly sidestepping these difficulties. 
Notwithstanding these design differences, many commentators assert that soft law’s primary 
relationship to custom is as a precursor for hard law. As Christine Chinkin explains this view, 
“[o]nce a prospective norm has been formulated in soft form it can become a catalyst for the 
development of customary international law. To many commentators this is the raison d’ ˆetre 
of soft law and its entry point into the traditional sources of law.” Implicit in this perspective is 
the belief that states become habituated to nonbinding norms over time, eventually accepting 
them as CIL. The canonical example is the path to custom followed by the rights in the 
nonbinding Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  75 
 
In 2013, a group of Berlin-Potsdam-based international law scholars started study whether the 
international legal order is facing a significant structural change, which we referred to as - ‘Rise 
or Decline of the International Rule of Law’ 76 Kolleg-Forcchergruppe is having a research 
working group of international lawyers in order to examine the role of international law in a 
changing global order.  The research project pursues the goal of determining whether public 
international law, as it has developed since the end of the Cold War, is continuing its progressive 
move towards a more human rights and multi-actor oriented order, or whether we are seeing a 
renewed emphasis of more classical elements of international law. In this context the term 
“international rule of law” is chosen to designate the more recent and “thicker” understanding 
of international law. The paper discusses how it can be determined whether this form of 
international law continues to unfold, and whether we are witnessing challenges to this order 
which could give rise to more fundamental reassessments. 77 
 
In the same time ICJ was, in a set of novel, even revolutionary, opinions, setting up the doctrinal 
basis for a re-think of the traditional sources of customary international law.  
In the Barcelona Traction decision, the ICJ, in adjudicating on a claim by Belgium on 
behalf of certain of its nationals who were shareholders in Barcelona Traction Ltd. (a trading 
company incorporated in Canada) against alleged actions of the Spanish state which Belgium 
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claimed were contrary to the principles of international law, greatly expanded the standing 
requirement under international law for states to claim violations. Normally, for a state to have 
standing to claim a violation of international law it must be directly affected by the violation at 
issue. However, as has been discussed, certain violations of customary international law are 
considered so vital that the system will allow any state to claim violation, and not simply the 
state directly affected – obligations erga omnes. In Barcelona Traction, the Court held that the 
‘basic rights of human persons’ created erga omnes obligations. Thus, in the eyes on the Court, 
the protection of human rights did have a place in the international legal system. 78 
  
 
2 Silence as consent in customary international law 
 
According to Peter Tiersma79  silence is consent- many are familiar with this adage, fewer 
have paused to reflect on its truth. There is no doubt that silence can be highly significant. Yet 
during most of our daily existence, our silence communicates nothing whatsoever. How can 
silence- the failure to speak- mean anything at all? Silence refers to a total absence of noise or 
sound. Or absence of speech. A person who remains silent in this sense might nonetheless 
communicate by nonverbal means. Using sign language or gestures. People do communicate 
by their failure to act, or by remaining silent. How is it then possible for people to communicate 
by doing nothing? Someone who remains silent- who does not speak or engage in nonverbal 
communication- would logically not seem to be communicating at all. In vast majority of cases, 
this is exactly what silence means. There are a surprising number of legal context where a 
person’s failure to act may be quite significant.  This use of silence or inaction in the law dates 
back at least to Roman times. One manner of freeing slaves in Ancient Rome, termed a 
manumission, involved a fictitious application to the magistrate claiming that the slave was 
wrongly held in bondage. The ritual was modeled on the vindicatio, a process for the recovery 
of property. A third party, the adsertor libertatis, claimed the slave's freedom on his behalf, by 
using specified ritual words and touching the slave with a wand. The owner, whose presence 
was required during this ritual, would also touch the slave with a wand. Critically, however, the 
owner remained silent. The magistrate then declared the slave free. Because the slaveowner 
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expressed his assent by silence, he could not be incapable of speaking. Otherwise his silence 
would be meaningless. This is therefore an example of where silence truly communicated 
consent to the manumission, no less than if the owner had used words to the same effect. 
Perhaps the best known example from the common law is that an offer to enter into a contract 
can be accepted by silence. Of course, silence following the receipt of an offer usually has no 
legal significance. Yet although it is exceptional for silence to operate as an acceptance, there 
is no doubt that it is possible. Finally, remaining silent when one's rights are threatened may be 
deemed a waiver of the right in question. For example, failing to object to misconduct by the 
opposing side during a trial normally constitutes a waiver of that objection. As a consequence, 
any unvoiced allegation of misconduct or error may not form the basis of an appeal. Perhaps 
the most controversial legal use of silence is when a court attributes meaning to inaction by 
Congress or another legislative body. For instance, the Supreme Court may give a statute a 
specific interpretation. Congress, if it disagrees with this interpretation, has the power to amend 
the statute and to override the Court's interpretation. In such instances, if Congress does not act, 
its silence is often viewed as acquiescence in, or approval of, the Court's interpretation of the 
statute.80 
 
It is commonly said that "silence is consent."' Often this is true enough. If generals in the field 
send a telegram to their commander-in-chief stating that they plan to bomb an enemy camp, 
and hear nothing in return, they can reasonably conclude, if communication lines are open, that 
the commander consents, or at least acquiesces in their action. What about silence of the 
populace in the face of government policies, especially tyrannical ones? This is sometimes also 
labeled consent. But surely the mere failure to protest does not necessarily indicate agreement 
with tyranny. People may be afraid to say anything. Those who suffered Holocaust during 
WWII may not have always verbalized their opposition, but it would be ludicrous to suggest 
that they consented to their fate. Others may plan to speak out but are awaiting the right 
opportunity. Some remain silent because “silent majority” as they endorse what their 
government is doing. Silence can often indicate apathy, preoccupation or fear. Knowing the 
persons political philosophy will help to guess the intention.81   
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As phrased by Corbin, "it is an old maxim that silence gives consent, but this is not a rule of 
law.  According to Corbin, if A, without more, has made an offer to B, and B remains silent, no 
contract has been formed. Especially when the negotiating does not take place by face-to-face 
communication, silence can support a number of inferences: that the offeree did not receive or 
understand the offer; that the offeree feels no obligation to respond to an offer that she had not 
solicited; that the offeree is thinking it over; that the offeree assumes that by not responding, 
the offeror will figure out that she is not interested in the proposal. At the very least, the parties 
must act in a way that makes it look as though they have reached an agreement. Silence or 
inaction by the offeree is thus the very antithesis of acts that create contractual obligation. The 
prevailing rule-that mere delay under these circumstances is not acceptance-conforms to the 
general principle that silence following an offer or question is ordinarily nothing more than a 
failure to respond, and thus communicates nothing. 82 
 
Despite fierce public critique, governments of EU member states have not objected to 
the ongoing practice of armed drone attacks. Whatever the reasons for this silence may be, in 
international law such non-reaction is not a mere absence. The silence of governments functions 
in particular ways and has become part of the current interpretative struggle about changing 
international principles regarding the right to self-defense and “targeted killing”. While some 
experts count this silence as tacit consent to “targeted killing” practices others dispute its legal 
value. This article builds on the work of linguistics to explore the functioning of silence in the 
diplomatic language games. The dominant reading of government silence is acquiescence in 
international law. Proposing alternative readings of government silence, this article shows how 
any interpretation of silence is necessarily a political act which channels the debate over 
whether and how international law is changing. I reflect silence not against but through its 
inherent ambiguity, thus revealing some obvious and some less obvious dangers of the EU 
policy of silence.83 
 
2.1 Concept of acquiescence 
 
According to Professor Malcolm N. Shaw the customary law is established by virtue of 
pattern of claim, absence of protest by states particularly interested in the matter at hand and 
acquiescence by other states.  Generally, where states are seen to acquiesce in the behavior of 
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other states without protesting against them, the assumption must be that such behavior is 
accepted as legitimate. Some writers have maintained that acquiescence can amount to consent 
to a customary rule and that absence of protest implies agreement. In other words where a state 
or states take action which they declare to be legal the silence of other states can be used as an 
expression of opinion juris or concurrence in the new legal rule. This means that actual protests 
are called for to break the legitimizing process. 84 
 
Perhaps the best known example from the common law is that an offer to enter into a 
contract can be accepted by silence. Of course, silence following the receipt of an offer usually 
has no legal significance. Yet although it is exceptional for silence to operate as an acceptance, 
there is no doubt that it is possible.85 
 
According to Nuno Sergio Marques Antunes in international law, the term 
‘acquiescence’—from the Latin quiescere (to be still)—denotes consent. It concerns a consent 
tacitly conveyed by a State, unilaterally, through silence or inaction, in circumstances such that 
a response expressing disagreement or objection in relation to the conduct of another State 
(Protest) would be called for. Acquiescence is thus consent inferred from a juridically relevant 
silence or inaction. Qui tacit consentire videtur si loqui debuisset ac potuisset (he who keeps 
silent is held to consent if he must and can speak). Acquiescence is usually presented as having 
its roots in Anglo-American law (acquiescence) and French procedural law (acquiescement). 
That said, it is necessary to point out that the two previous concepts are clearly distinct. Whereas 
the former also operates in the realm of substantive law, the latter is confined to adjective law 
(ie the aggregate of rules of procedure and enforcement through which substantive law is 
implemented). These differences signal that extrapolations or transpositions thereof into 
international law should be carried out cautiously. Further, it should be borne in mind that 
similar concepts probably exist in other domestic systems. At the international level, this was 
already noted, for example, by Judge Ammoun, with respect to Islamic law, in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany v Netherlands) (Merits) ([1969] ICJ Rep 121). here is perhaps little doubt 
nevertheless, that acquiescence (much like the related notion of estoppel) has emerged by virtue 
of the marked influence of Anglo-American legal thought in international law, in particular 
since the late 19th century. For example, the figure of estoppel by acquiescence, existent in 
Anglo-American law, has in it much of the hallmarks of acquiescence in international law. 
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Notwithstanding this, once transposed into international law, the notion of acquiescence was 
developed and elaborated within the framework of the international legal system. This took 
place, throughout the last century, in a number of judicial and arbitral decisions, and also in 
doctrinal and scholarly writings. In international law, acquiescence has primarily a substantive 
bearing. It operates in the realm of the vicissitudes of juridical situations. Rights and duties may 
be constituted, modified, disposed of or terminated by the effect of acquiescence. While it may 
impact on fields of law, its particular relevance in territorial and boundary issues, or issues 
relating thereto, deserves emphasis. The examples of case law below provide a useful 
illustration. Acquiescence as a legal tool is often used in third-party proceedings. Parties to 
disputes resort to it as means to assert or deny claims, through evidence such as treaties, maps, 
diplomatic correspondence, official documents and notes, records and archives, and the relative 
conduct of States. This evidence is contextualized within a specific factual matrix. And it is 
canvassed as an argument seeking to demonstrate the existence of consent expressed by the 
opposing party in some respect. Customary International Law has equally closely-knit relations 
with acquiescence. General toleration by the international community may lend support to an 
emerging customary rule, and lead to the departure from an existing rule (eg Fisheries Case); 
just as the non-existence of a general acquiescence of nations may indicate the non-existence 
of a rule (eg Tinoco Concessions Arbitration). The notion of acquiescence is not exempt from 
difficulties, the most prominent and complex of which being the polysemous nature of silence 
or inaction. The maxim qui tacit consentire videtur (he who keeps silent is held to consent) is 
contradicted by a neutral maxim qui tacit neque negat, neque utique fatetur (he who keeps silent 
is held neither to deny nor to accept). With respect to acquiescence, international law appears 
to have adopted a midway point between these two maxims. Silence or inaction is tantamount 
to consent only when qualified by reference to the si loqui debuisset ac potuisset requirement. 
The practice of courts has had a particular weight in confirming this content as derived from 
good faith and equity (Good Faith (Bona fide) and Equity in International Law). Thus defined, 
the juridical value and meaning of silence or inaction depends on the circumstances in casu. 
The interpretation of silence or inaction is then usually made in relative terms, account taken 
of the specific (sequence of) facts and the relationship between the States involved. 
International law remains a horizontal legal order, with a minor level of institutionalization. 
Proprio sensu, it lacks a ‘legislator’, an ‘adjudicator’ and an ‘enforcer’. In such a legal order, 
where the interaction between subjects is paramount, and in which the principle of consent is 
preserved, acquiescence continues to be significant, in particular since protection of legitimate 
expectations and good faith in international dealings are ever more present. The concept of 
acquiescence, principled in nature, conveys a sense of certainty (good faith) and justice (equity). 
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In so far as these two notions are ever-prevailing aims of legal systems, and since acquiescence 
is a legal by-product of their implementation, it is likely to remain a cornerstone of the 
contemporary international law. Pleas of acquiescence similar to those aforementioned will thus 
continue to arise in the foreseeable future. Acuter problems may emerge nowadays when use 
of force. Silent conduct or inaction in respect of these issues will require a legal answer. The 
certainty and justice promoted by the concept of acquiescence, however, cannot be decoupled 
from the difficulties inherent therein. A cautious approach to findings of acquiescence continues 
to be warranted, the burden of proof lying on the party invoking it. Instances in which this may 
be relevant are far from uniform, and silence or inaction is seldom an adequate manifestation 
of consent. The issues surrounding acquiescence relate ultimately to a sphere of discretion 
which States enjoy, their conduct being under scrutiny in what are usually rather complex 
situations.86 
 
2.1.1 International Jurisprudence 
 
  According to Antunes identifying the case law in which acquiescence was (autonomously) 
referred to is not an easy task. Instances in which acquiescence was invoked are too numerous 
to be exhaustively dealt with here and cover virtually all subject-matters. Further, recourse 
thereto comes often hand in hand with estoppel-related arguments. Setting the two notions apart 
in mutually exclusive terms is rather difficult. A vaster jurisprudence referring to acquiescence, 
and conceptualizing it, emerged after the mid-20th century. Once more, courts dealt with it both 
in the affirmative and in the negative. Findings of acquiescence appear in the Fisheries Case 
(United Kingdom v Norway) (Merits) ([1951] ICJ Rep 134–39) Continental Shelf Arbitration 
(France v United Kingdom) (18 Rep Intl Arbitral Awards 68–74), Even cases in which no 
findings of acquiescence underlay the decision contributed to shape the notion of acquiescence, 
as happened with the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v Denmark; Germany v 
Netherlands) (Merits) ([1969] ICJ Rep 25–7), Continental Shelf Case (Tunisia v Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya) (Merits) ([1982] ICJ Rep 68–71, 83–5), Gulf of Maine Case (Canada v United 
States of America) (Merits) ([1984] ICJ Rep 303–12), Elettronica Sicula Case (United States 
of America v Italy) (Merits) ([1989] ICJ Rep 43–4), Territorial Dispute Case (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya/Chad) (Merits) ([1994] ICJ Rep 36–7) and Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria Case (Cameroon v Nigeria) (Merits) ([2002] ICJ Rep 333–55, 412–16, 
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437–48).  Acquiescence is indubitably a notion that is entangled with the notion of estoppel. In 
the Gulf of Maine Case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated that the same facts are 
relevant to both notions, and that it could take the two into consideration as they are different 
aspects of one and the same institution. It added also that both follow from the fundamental 
principles of good faith and equity. But the two notions are distinct. First and foremost, estoppel 
entails a detrimental reliance by one State. Evidence that that State has openly relied on a certain 
situation of fact, and that a change thereof would lead to undue prejudice (or an unjustified 
benefit for the other State), is the crucial element, enunciated by the ICJ in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases. Secondly, acquiescence signals an expression of consent (albeit tacitly 
conveyed), whereas for estoppel to arise there is no requirement of consent. Irrespective of the 
existence of consent by a State, that State becomes bound by its conduct. These two elements 
characterize the predominant view on the distinction between these legal notions. The 
suggestion is further made that estoppel may emerge as legal consequence of an acquiescing 
conduct. The ICJ’s finding of acquiescence in the Temple of Preah Vihear Case, followed by a 
finding of estoppel, evinces perhaps better than any other the entangled nature of the two 
notions, and how estoppel may indeed stem from an acquiescing conduct. Similarly, the 
Electtronica Sicula Case illustrates this point by stating that an estoppel can arise in certain 
circumstances from silence, when something ought to have been said. The difficulties in 
disentangling the two notions can be such that some authors have actually suggested that 
estoppel is a useless institution, for it flows from a commitment of the State in relation to a 
certain situation, ie from consent. 87 
 
Already in 1929, in the Case of the Lotus (France v Turkey) (Merits) (PCIJ Rep Series A No 
10) (Lotus, The), the PCIJ stated that international law is based on the will of States expressed 
in conventions or in ‘usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law’ (at 18). The 
ICJ has developed the two-element theory of customary law, especially in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands) (Merits) ([1969] ICJ Rep 3), where it states that actions by States ‘not 
only must amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a 
way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of 
the rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, ie the existence of a subjective element, 
is implicit in the very notion of the opinio iuris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must 
therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation’ (at para. 77). 
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Similarly, in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua 
v United States of America) (Merits) (‘Nicaragua Case’) ([1986] ICJ Rep 14), the court stated: 
‘For a new customary rule to be formed not only must the acts concerned “amount to a settled 
practice” but they must be accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitatis’ (at para. 207). In 
the Case concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area 
(Canada/United States of America) (Merits) ([1984] ICJ Rep 246) (Gulf of Maine Case), the 
court speaks of ‘customary rules whose presence in the opinio juris of States can be tested by 
induction based on the analysis of a sufficiently extensive and convincing practice, and not by 
deduction from preconceived ideas’.88 
 
ICJ emphasized that some degree of uniformity among states was essential before a custom 
could come into existence in Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case. United Kingdom in its 
arguments against Norwegian method of measuring the breath of the territorial sea, referred to 
an alleged rule of custom whereby a straight line may be drawn across bays of less than 10 
miles from one projection to the other which could then be regarded as the measurement of the 
territorial sea. The court dismissed this by pointing out that the actual practice of states did not 
justify the creation any such custom. In other words, there has been insufficient uniformity of 
behavior.  In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases which involved a dispute between Germany 
and Holland and Denmark on the other side, over the delamination of the continental shelf, the 
ICJ remarked that state practice had to be both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of 
the provision invoked. This was held to be indispensable to the formation of a new rule of 
customary international law.  However the court emphasized in the Nicaragua v United States 
case that it was not necessary that the practice in question had to be in absolutely rigorous 
conformity with the purposed customary rule. The threshold that needs to be attained before a 
legally binding custom can be created will depend both upon the nature of the alleged rule and 
the opposition it arouses. 89 
 
According to Professor Shaw that acquiescence must be based upon full knowledge of the rule 
invoked. Where a failure to take a course od action is in some way connected or influenced or 
accompanied by lack of knowledge of all the relevant circumstances, then it cannot interpreted 
as acquiescence. 90 
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2.2 Collective security actions in Syria 
 
In 1999, NATO countries bombed Serbian forces in Kosovo without U.N. Security 
Council authorization, seeking to prevent mass atrocities against the Kosovar Albanians. 
NATO’s actions triggered a wave of soft law norm creation involving humanitarian 
intervention. The most ambitious soft law instrument, drafted by scholars and diplomats on the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), articulated a new 
principle—the responsibility to protect (R2P)—that emphasized the duty of all nations to 
protect civilians at risk and suggested that states might, in exceptional circumstances, use force 
even absent U.N. Security Council approval. In the decade that followed, proponents of R2P 
sought to bolster this principle and its application to a range of humanitarian crises. However, 
when states themselves endorsed the R2P at the 2005 World Summit, they expressly rejected 
language suggesting that force could be used without U.N. Security Council authorization.  
The recent controversy over whether to use force in response to the atrocities in the civil war in 
Syria reveals the continuing competition among states over soft law and CIL in this area. The 
United Kingdom is a proponent of humanitarian intervention in Syria. The government did not, 
however, advance that claim by relying on the nonbinding R2P principle. Instead, it turned to 
custom. A 2014 letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office drew a sharp distinction 
between the “legal basis of humanitarian intervention and the concept of the responsibility to 
protect.” 91  
 
Eschewing R2P, the United Kingdom cited prior uses of force without U.N. Security Council 
approval—Kosovo in 1999, the Kurds in Northern Iraq in 1991, and the no fly zones in Northern   
Iraq from 1991.The United Kingdom reaffirmed this position with respect to Syria, arguing that 
“intervention may be permitted under international law in exceptional circumstances where the 
U.N. Security Council is unwilling or unable to act in order to avert a humanitarian catastrophe 
. . . .” The United Kingdom has not framed its options as a choice between soft law and hard 
law; rather, it has invoked custom as an alternative to both the U.N. Charter and the nonbinding 
R2P principle. Our framework also correctly predicts  
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How the United Kingdom would seek to develop this custom—by the projection of power and 
by raising normative arguments. 92 
 
 An analysis based on custom’s domains suggests that, given the strong distributional 
effects of international rules on the use force, the confluence of normative and hegemonic 
custom explains why some states are choosing CIL to create new humanitarian intervention. 
The United States and the United Kingdom are powerful countries, supporting hegemonic 
custom. Humanitarian intervention also has a strong normative component. The United 
Kingdom relied in part on normative arguments in its 2013 statement on the use of force in 
Syria. The United Kingdom maintained that “[i]f action in the Security Council is blocked, the 
UK would still be permitted under international law to take exceptional measures in order to 
alleviate the scale of the overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe in Syria by deterring and 
disrupting the further use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. Such a legal basis is 
available, under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.”93 President Obama defended 
potential military intervention in Syria in part by asking “[w]hat message will we send if a 
dictator can gas hundreds of children to death in plain sight and pay no price?” Although it is 
still unclear whether the confluence of hegemonic and normative pressures will lead to  the 
formation of a new customary rule, this example aptly illustrates not  only the incentives that 
states have to choose custom as an alternative to treaties, but also the difficulty of operating 
with custom’s domains.94 
 
It is generally accepted that the Security Council, instead of acting directly, may 
authorize Member States to use military force. This has become an established practice in spite 
of the criticism that, through this practice, the Security Council loses control over the 
enforcement actions undertaken by the States concerned. authorization of Member States or 
regional organizations to take forcible measures under Chapter VII can be divided into several 
decisions, namely, that there is a threat to international peace or security, a breach of peace or 
aggression, that measures under Article 41 of the UN Charter are not adequate and that a 
particular State, or groups of States or regional organization should take action. It is generally 
accepted that limits for the delegation of forcible actions exist. Such limits are not specified in 
the UN Charter; they evolve from general considerations on the delegation of powers. Such 
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limits include a precise definition of the scope of the delegated power and the effective 
supervision of the functions exercised by the mandated entity. To assess the practice of the 
Security Council in this respect it is necessary to distinguish between targeted sanctions, peace 
keeping missions, the administration of territories and mandating military enforcement 
measures. It has been argued that the practice of the Security Council is not coherent in this 
respect. The report will return to this issue in the context of discussing judicial control and its 
limits.95 
 
United Nations Security Council has issued many resolutions about situation in Syria. 
Resolution 2254 from 2015 states following:  Expressing its gravest concern at the continued 
suffering of the Syrian people, the dire and deteriorating humanitarian situation, the ongoing 
conflict and its persistent and brutal violence, the negative impact of terrorism and violent 
extremist ideology in support of terrorism, the destabilizing effect of the crisis on the region  
and beyond, including the resulting increase in terrorists drawn to the fighting in Syria, the 
physical destruction in the country, and increasing sectarianism, and underscoring that the 
situation will continue to deteriorate in the absence of a political solution. 96 
 
2015 issued resolution no 2199 about ISIS and Al-Nusra’s illicit funding via oil exports, traffic 
of cultural heritage, ransom payments and external donations.97 
 
2015 res no 2209 This resolution condemned the use of toxic chemicals such as chlorine, 
without attributing blame; stressed that those responsible should be held accountable; recalled 
resolution 2118; and supported the 4 February 2015 decision of the OPCW. 
 
2015 resolution no 2249 Called for member states to take all necessary measures on the 
territory under the control of ISIS to prevent terrorist acts committed by ISIS and other Al-
Qaida affiliates. The wording is as follows: art 5- Calls upon Member States that have the 
capacity to do so to take all necessary measures, in compliance with international law, in 
particular with the United Nations Charter, as well as international human rights, refugee and  
humanitarian law, on the territory under the control of ISIL also known as Da’esh, in Syria and 
Iraq, to redouble and coordinate their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed 
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specifically by ISIL also known as Da’esh as well as ANF, and all other individuals, groups, 
undertakings, and entities associated with Al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups, as designated 
by the United Nations Security Council, and as may further be agreed by the International Syria 
Support Group (ISSG) and endorsed by the UN Security Council, pursuant to the Statement of 
the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) of 14 November, and to eradicate the safe haven 
they have established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria;98 
 
 According to Ashley Deeks the operative paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution no. 
2249 has unusual wording. Dapo Akande and Marko Milanovic have an excellent analysis of 
this provision on EJILTalk!  There, they note that this provision is unprecedented.  Most 
UNSCRs that authorize force have several features: (1) they contain a preambular paragraph 
that specifically invokes Chapter VII; (2) they use the word “decides” as the active verb in the 
paragraph that authorizes force; and (3) they use the term “all necessary means” or “all 
necessary measures” as the code for force authorization.  OP5 is a hybrid, because it lacks the 
first two features but contains the third – “all necessary measures.”  As a result, Akande and 
Milanovic conclude—correctly, I believe—that OP5 likely is not intended to serve as a stand-
alone authorization for using force against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Akande and Milanovic argue 
that the paragraph is crafted to create constructive ambiguity.  The paragraph would seem to 
forge a compromise between Russia and all other states currently using force in Syria.  Russia 
is acting against ISIS in Syria with Assad’s consent, and asserts that other bases for using force 
in Syria are inconsistent with international law.  The United States, France, Canada, Australia, 
Turkey, and other states are using force in Syria on a theory of collective self-defense of Iraq 
or of national self-defense or both. 99 
 
2.3 Defeating the Islamic State (Daesh) 
 
The Islamic State (ISIS) burst onto the world stage in 2014, capturing vast stretches of 
Iraq and Syria, brutally and publicly killing Western prisoners, and declaring itself a new pan-
Islamic caliphate. President Obama announced an American effort to roll back and eventual 
defeat the Islamic State, and enlisted an international coalition of Arab and Western powers to 
accomplish that goal. This effort has, in turn, raised a host of new questions: about effectiveness 
and commitment, about international law, about presidential authority, about the interpretive 
                                                 
98 S/RES/2249 (2015) 
99 Deeks, A. Threading the Needle in Security Council Resolution 2249. Accessible 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/threading-needle-security-council-resolution-2249. (April 14. 2018) 
46 
 
limits of an out-of-date domestic authorization for the use of force, and about the general 
viability of American policy in the region.100 
 
In 2015 the UK House of Commons Library has released “Legal basis for UK military 
action in Syria”. The current legal basis for military action in Iraq is also invitation and/or 
collective self-defense. In September 2014 the House of Commons voted in favor of the UK joining 
air strikes against ISIS/Daesh in Iraq (but not Syria). The motion cited Iraq’s ‘request for 
international support to defend itself against the threat ISIL poses to Iraq and its citizens’ as the 
‘clear legal basis’ for military action in Iraq. 101 
 
Paulina Starcki published a paper in 2016 online (the paper has amendments made in 
2018 and the process is still ongoing) titled “Silence within the process of normative change 
and evolution of the prohibition on the use of force- normative volatility and legislative 
responsibility”. Focusing on the operations of the ‘Global Coalition against ISIL’ in Syria, this 
article examines whether the mere silence of states in view of state actions that challenge the 
established reading of Arts. 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter might induce and consolidate a 
process of normative change, and if so, under what conditions. While a ‘legislative 
responsibility’ is incumbent on states in situations of ‘normative volatility’, which requires 
them to ‘speak up’, I submit that silent behavior generates norm-evolutionary effects only under 
strict conditions. Such effects occur if other states and the international community can 
legitimately expect that a state makes its dissenting position known. The determination of such 
an expectation requires an overall assessment of numerous factors including: the determinacy 
of the legality claims made by the acting states, the capacity of silent states to act, the specific 
circumstances in which a claim was made, the determinacy of reactive claims of other actors, 
and questions of time, as well as the nature of the affected rules. I conclude by finding that mere 
passivity in light of the legality-claims currently made with regard to Coalition airstrikes against 
ISIL positions in Syria does not amount to ‘acquiescence’. 102 
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Global Coalition published an overview about airstrikes, civilian casualties and 
investigations on 2017 where the paper claim that how rigorous is the process for deciding 
which targets to strike. The Coalition strikes only valid military targets, after considering 
principles of military necessity, humanity, proportionality and distinction. We apply rigorous 
standards to our targeting process – and pilots can and do decide not to strike if they have any 
reasons to believe there is a risk of causing civilian casualties. In determining targets, they use 
a wide variety of tools, including visual sensors, human intelligence and signals intelligence, to 
not only identify where Daesh fighters may be located, but also to identify the objects on that 
battlefield that they value.103 
 
 
2.4 Doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
 
International Humanitarian Law deals with how force may be employed by the parties 
to an armed conflict, known as jus in bello. International Humanitarian Law in particular 
customary international law and Geneva Conventions with their 1977 Additional Protocols104, 
contains, inter alia, the rules governing attacks, delineates protection to which certain persons 
and objects are entitled, and restricts the kinds of weapons that may be employed in order to 
conduct hostilities. 105 
 
Humanitarian intervention offers another illustration of custom’s overlapping domains, 
provides another example of the substantive advantages of a custom over treaties that regulate 
the same subject area. The U.N. Charter prohibits the unilateral use of force in response to 
humanitarian crises in the absence of U.N. Security Council authorization or plausible claims 
of self-defense. U.N. Security Council approval is often blocked by political differences among 
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that body’s five veto-wielding permanent members. Some states  are dissatisfied with the status 
quo have turned to customary international law, implicitly or explicitly, to justify a military 
response to humanitarian crises if the U.N. Security Council fails to act. Such states are, in 
effect, claiming that custom offers a superior substantive norm that should displace the 
substantive constraints of the U.N. Charter. 106 
 
The humanitarian intervention is the argument offered in the only legal opinion issued 
by UK government. There is no exception to the UN charter regime for humanitarian 
intervention. Responsibility to protect is the basis of humanitarian intervention and the principle 
is required action via UN. 107 
 
UK government officially endorsed humanitarian intervention as a legal basis for using 
force against Syria. While it is not supported by a detailed legal analysis, it sets out three legal 
conditions for the use of force in a humanitarian intervention without UN Security Council 
authorization, and finds that Syria fulfils these criteria on the facts. This is as formal an 
expression of opinio juris by the UK as is possible, and probably the most official endorsement 
to date of humanitarian intervention (note also the absence of any reference to R2P). 
Humanitarian intervention is not permissible in international law as it stands today, on 29 
August 2013. The key issue for me here is how the UK is essentially trying to change 
international law by asserting a position and waiting to see how other players will react and 
possibly validate its view; the conceptual problems that Dapo points to aside, this is essentially 
how customary law works. I’d also refer readers to an excellent 1994 piece by James Crawford 
and Thomas Viles called ‘International Law on a Given Day’, on custom as ex-post facto 
rationalization, which is excerpted in part here. The language of the UK guidance with regard 
to the three criteria reproduces almost verbatim an October 1998 FCO memo in respect of the 
impending intervention against the FRY, which is itself quoted in this article by Adam Roberts 
at p. 106.  One key difference between the two memos is that the 1998 uses UN Security 
Council resolution 1199 and UN reports as convincing evidence of an impending humanitarian 
catastrophe, and this is missing with respect to Syria.108 Philippe Sands QC, professor of 
international law at University College London, said the argument set out on Thursday by the 
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attorney general, Dominic Grieve, "is premised on factual assumptions – principally that the 
weapons were used by the Syrian government, that the use of force by the UK would deter or 
disrupt the further use of chemical weapons – that are not established on the basis of information 
publicly available". Sands said that in the absence of the UK invoking any right of self-defense 
or a UN Security Council resolution authorizing force, the coalition's case is premised on a legal 
argument about humanitarian intervention that is controversial but could be available under 
certain conditions. The government claim in its legal note that it is allowed to use strikes to 
"deter and disrupt" the further use of chemical weapons is also too lax, according to Dapo 
Akande, co-director of the Oxford institute for ethics, law and armed conflict. "Even if there is 
a rule allowing intervention to avert a humanitarian catastrophe that rule would not simply 
permit action to deter and disrupt use of chemical weapons," Akande said. "This standard is too 
lax. It would be a rule about preventing and about stopping. The UK is not proposing to take 
action which will actually prevent or stop further uses of chemical weapons." Grieve said the 
UK could legitimately take military action to "alleviate the scale of the overwhelming 
humanitarian catastrophe" as long as three conditions are met. That there is "convincing 
evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme 
humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief"; it is "objectively 
clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved"; and the 
proposed use of force is "proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian need". Akande said 
the case falls down on the second point because there are still avenues to be explored. "There 
are measures that the UK/US have not yet tried, for example trying to get approval from the 
UN general assembly under the 'uniting for peace' procedure," he said. "This would allow the 
general assembly to take action in cases where the Security Council is blocked by threat or use 
of the veto". He also said "action could be taken to refer the matter to the international criminal 
court – which is also action to deter further uses". Akande added that when the attorney general's 
advice says international law allows Britain to take measures to alleviate a humanitarian 
catastrophe without Security Council approval, this can only be in reference to customary 
international law which is based on the "views and practices of states". He said there is "very 
little evidence of state support for this view. Indeed most states have explicitly rejected this 
view."109 
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In the Committee’s understanding, the Government considers that, under the doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention, it would be lawful for the UK to use force against another state 
without a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of such force, if the Security 
Council cannot agree to authorize the use of force, and if other conditions are met (convincing  
and generally accepted evidence of extreme humanitarian distress, no practicable alternative,  
proportionate and limited force). The Committee’s understanding is based on the legal advice  
that the Government published on 29 August 2013 in connection with possible UK military  
action against Syria. legal position set out by the current Government at the end of  August 
2013 is the same as that advanced by the then Government in 1998-1999 with respect to the 
NATO military action against the then Yugoslavia (in the FCO note circulated to NATO Allies 
in October 1998 and the Defense Secretary’s statement to the House on 25 March 1999). 
However, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded in 2000 that the 
NATO military action was “illegal but legitimate. US to be as committed to the protection of 
civilians as the UK. The Administration’s 2010 National Security Strategy110 makes clear that 
the US supports the concept of R2P and that in cases when prevention fails, “the United States 
will work both multilaterally and bilaterally to mobilize diplomatic, humanitarian, financial, 
and – in certain instances – military means to prevent and respond to genocide and mass 
atrocities”. The position of the UK Government is that intervention may be permitted under 
international law in exceptional circumstances where the UN Security Council is unwilling or 
unable to act in order to avert a humanitarian catastrophe subject to the three conditions set out 
above. The UK Government does not consider that this has adverse implications for the UN. It 
also is important to recognize that the responsibility to protect emerged after NATO’s 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. The responsibility to protect was in many ways a response 
to what its framers saw as the failures of the Security Council over its reaction to the genocide 
in Rwanda in 1994 (where it acted too late), and to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo in 1999 
(where it did not authorize an intervention). The adoption of the responsibility to protect was 
therefore an attempt to move debate away from a focus solely on external military intervention 
by emphasizing the responsibility of States towards their own populations, but also to signal 
the UN membership’s support for the idea that, if necessary, the Security Council can and 
should act in the face of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity; 
the expectation being that this political commitment would make Security Council action more 
likely and less controversial in future. As set out in the note of the Government’s legal position 
published on 29 August 2013 in connection with possible UK military action against Syria, if 
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action in the Security Council is blocked, the position of the Government is that it is permitted 
under international law to take exceptional measures in order to avert a humanitarian 
catastrophe.  
 
UK has used Legal basis is available, under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, provided 
three conditions are met: 
(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as 
a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and 
urgent relief; 
(ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of 
force if lives are to be saved; and 
(iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief 
of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to this aim (i.e. the 
minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other purpose). 
 
In October 1998 a Government note was circulated to NATO allies identifying these three key 
criteria.111 
 
A point of controversy of heightened relevance in the cyber context involves so called 
“war-sustaining objects. It is widely accepted that war-fighting” and “war-supporting” objects 
are lawful targets. Warfighting objects are those used to engage in the hostilities, such as 
military cyber infrastructure. War-supporting objects directly contribute to the hostilities, 
although they not used during them. Factories producing military equipment are the 
paradigmatic example and accordingly may lawfully be targeted by cyber means. “War-
sustaining” objects only indirectly support the war effort. An example would be an industry that 
provides significant revenue upon which the armed conflict depends. This is most likely to be 
the case in situations where a state depends on proceeds or taxes from the industry to fund the 
war effort, as in the case of oil for many oil-exporting states. As an example, cyber infrastructure 
that controls oil storage facilities or a pipeline used for the transshipment of oil is, by the war-
sustaining approach, a lawful military objectives. The United States takes the position that war-
sustaining objects are valid targets that may be directly attacked. A majority of the International 
                                                 
111 Op cit A Latter from Rt Hugh Robertson MP, 2014, pp 2-5 
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Group of Experts rejected the approach on the basis that the connection between such objects 
and military operations is too attenuated to produce a “definite military advantage. 112 
 
2.5 Targeting war-sustaining military objects 
 
Additional Protocol I (1977) to Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art 52 (2) states general protection 
of civilian objects. Paragraph 2 states that Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. 
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.113 Art 51 (5) (b) about protecting of the civilian population 
states that an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
 
According to Charlie Dunlap published a paper about why striking certain war-
sustaining targets can save lives found that it would be wrong to not use means proven to 
effectively weaken a barbaric enemy while also being more protective of civilians than the 
alternatives. This controversial topic is focused on the current practice of the coalition opposing 
the Islamic Sates in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) striking ISIS oil facilities and cash hoards that are 
sustaining their ability on the battlefield.  (The sale of oil is reportedly now the main source of 
Islamic States revenue.). As I explain in my post, there are “open source” reports that as much 
as two-thirds of ISIS’s “caliphate’s” budget goes for weapons and the pay of 
fighters.  Moreover, there is other evidence that when the pay stops or is cut, ISIS fighters leave 
the field, or don’t come in the first place. In other words, the legitimacy of a “war-sustaining” 
target can be very fact-specific.  But as to ISIS, the fact clearly favor the propriety of the 
particular wars-sustaining targets the coalition has been striking.114 
 
                                                 
112 Schmitt, N.M. Peacetime Cyber Responses and Wartime Cyber Operations Under International 
Law: an analytical Vade Mecum. Harvard National Security Journal. Vol 8. 2017. Accessile 
http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Schmitt-NSJ-Vol-8.pdf. (March 29,2018) 
113 Protocol Additional to Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 8, June 1977. Accessibly https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=F08A9BC78AE
360B3C12563CD0051DCD4. (April 14, 2018)  
114 Routledge Handbook of Air Power. Edited by Olsen, J. A. 2018. 
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According to Routledge Handbook of Air Power115 there has been debate going on about 
targeting war-sustaining objects and targeting ISIS oil production and distribution facilities. 
The main question remains whether the object meets the AP I 1977 art 52 (2) definition of a 
military objective. Prior to WW 2 the United States determined that the successful application 
of air power requires a predetermined plan calculated to destroy the enemy’s will and war 
sustaining capabilities. Concluding operations to damage the enemy’s will and war sustaining 
capabilities rather than simply wearing down the enemy’s field forces, requires deconstructing 
enemy systems to identify objectives of particular strategic value. Sometimes those systems lie 
outside the traditional notion of a military target. On 22 Sept. 2014 a collation led by US began 
aerial attacks in Syria against ISIS, The campaign included the controversial targeting of ISIS/ 
controlled oil operations facilities. The coalition justified these attacks by stating that these 
small-scale refineries provide fuel to run ISIS operations, money to finance their continued 
attacks thorough Iraq and Syria, and they are an economic assets to support future operations. 
The controversial issue is whether war sustaining objects should be included in the legal 
meaning of military sustaining objects as economic objects of the enemy that indirectly but 
effectively support and sustain the enemy’s war- fighting capabilities.  However the 
characterization of war sustaining entities as lawful targets has been wildly criticized. 
Opponents argue that the requirement to make an effective contribution to military action 
suggests excluding objects that indirectly support the war effort, such as oil production facilities 
and oil transports not set aside for military use. The targeting of ISIS oil production is 
complicated in that the oil facilities and subsequent revenue are controlled by organized armed 
groups, not a state actor. ISIS does engage in some governance-like activities, it is not a state 
entity and it utilizes the revenue largely to fund insurgency and terrorism-related activities. 
Treaty law related to the targeting of civilian objects during a non-international armed conflicts 
is quite limited as compared to the law governing international armed conflicts. The general 
consensus exists that the targeting of civilian objects is prohibited during non-international 
armed conflicts, the particulars of that prohibition have an increased level of ambiguity. Closely 
related to the targeting of oil-related facilities is the issue of targeting individuals operating 
those facilities. The facility works who are not part of the organized armed groups, in this case 
ISIS, must be considered as civilians when conducting targeting analysis. More controversial 
is the targeting of members of ISIS whose function within the organized armed groups (OAG) 
is the operation or oversight of oil facilities, as opposed to those ISIS members with combat 
                                                 
115 Dunlap, J.D. Why striking certain war-sustaining targets can save lives. April 2017. Lawfire. 
Accessible https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2017/04/10/why-striking-certain-war-sustaining-targets-can-
save-lives/. (April 14, 2018) 
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function. Considerable disagreement has emerged over whether members of an OAG are 
required to have a continued combat function to be considered legal targets. If such requirement 
exists, then members of ISIS whose function is solely to operate oil production and distribution 
would not be valid targets. If not then these workers are targetable by virtue of their membership 
in ISIS alone. It is tempting to view the lack of widespread objections by states to the targeting 
of ISIS oil assets as a signal that states are moving towards an acceptance of ISIS oil assets as 
a signal that states are moving towards an acceptance of targeting war-sustaining objects. This 
may be a political decision based on the widespread rejection of ISIS ideology and methods. 116 
 
According to Ryan Goodman argues “war sustaining objects in non-international armed 
conflicts used to generate revenue for an enemy’s armed forces, should be targetable under 
international humanitarian law.”  Targeting War sustaining activities, even in the context of the 
fighting against ISIS, sets dangerous precedent and violates the established rules of IHL. The 
weight of scholarly opinion has long maintained that war sustaining objects are not legitimate 
military targets. 117 
I completely agree with views of Julia E. Padeanu.  
 
 
 
2.6 Approaches on United Nations Security Council level  
Security Council resolution 2170 from 2014 states that118: 
Art 6. Reiterates its call upon all States to take all measures as may be necessary and appropriate 
and in accordance with their obligations under international law to counter incitement of 
terrorist acts motivated by extremism and intolerance perpetrated by individuals or entities  
Associated with ISIL, ANF and Al-Qaida and to prevent the subversion of educational, cultural, 
and religious institutions by terrorists and their supporters.  
 
I argue that the wording of Security Council resolution is unusual to its usual strong call to take 
all measures necessary to take action. No strong wording for concreate action leaves room for 
interpretation and let States to decide whether they need to take action or stand still. Meaning 
                                                 
116 Routledge Handbook of Air Power. Edited by Olsen, J. A. 2018.  
117 Padeanu, J.E. Accepting that War-sustaining objects are Legitimate Targets under IHL is a terrible 
idea. March 2017. Yale Journal of International Law, Accessible http://www.yjil.yale.edu/accepting-
that-war-sustaining-objects-are-legitimate-targets-under-ihl-is-a-terrible-idea/. (April 14, 2018) 
118 S/RES/2170 (2014) para 13 , 14 
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state do not say anything and use silence. Therefore Security Council is participating in forming 
silence and it could not be interpreted as an emergence or acceptance of new customary law 
norm as silence.  
 
Art 13.  Notes with concern that oilfields and related infrastructure controlled by  ISIL, ANF 
and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated  with Al  -Qaida, are 
generating income which support their recruitment efforts and strengthen their operational 
capability to organize and carry out terrorist attacks;  
Art 14. Condemns any engagement in direct or indirect trade involving ISIL, ANF and all other 
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al - Qaida, and reiterates. That 
such engagement could constitute financial support for entities designated by the Committee 
pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) (“the Committee”) and may lead to further 
listings by the Committee;  
 
Resolution 2199 (2015)  
“Reiterating its deep concern that oilfields and their related infrastructure, as well as other 
infrastructure such as dams and power plants, controlled by ISIL, ANF and potentially other 
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida, are generating a 
significant portion of the groups’ income, alongside extortion, private foreign donations, kidnap 
ransoms and stolen money from the territory they control, which support their recruitment 
efforts and strengthen their operational capability to organize and carry out terrorist attacks. 
Under Oil Trade section - 1.   Condemns any engagement in direct or indirect trade, in particular 
of oil and oil products, and modular refineries and related material, with ISIL, ANF and any 
other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities designated as associated with Al-Qaida 
/…/“ Art 10.  Expresses concern that vehicles, including aircraft, cars and trucks and oil tankers, 
departing from or going to areas of Syria and Iraq where ISIL, ANF or any other groups, 
undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida operate, could be used to transfer oil and oil 
products, modular refineries and related material, /…/ by or on behalf of such entities for sale 
on international markets, for barter for arms, /…/ 
 
Security Council has noted and condemned the action about direct or indirect commodity trade 
involvement in both above mentioned resolutions. If there is a lucrative trade agreement coming 
up between states there is a reasonable ground for the States involved to keep quiet and be silent 
about the upcoming beneficial gain from trade transaction. I argue that if there is an economical 
element attached to States practice about silence there is no possibility to interpret the silence 
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as emerging endorsement or acceptance to customary international law norm. States keep silent 
in order to protect their national economic interest only. 119 
 
UN International Law Commission  in recent years has shifted away from codification 
efforts to principles, conclusions and draft articles that it does not recommend be turned into 
treaties. Using principal-agent theory the shift is explained by positing that increasing political 
gridlock in the UN General Assembly and it has led the Commission to modify the form of its 
work to preserve its influence in shaping the evolution of international law. The shift away from 
draft treaties increases the salience of the methodology that the International Law Commission 
uses to enhance its influence when the traditional constraint of UN General Assembly review 
is unavailable due to gridlock. International Law Commission will select and relatively 
consistently adhere to a methodological approach that attaching the support of the audience it 
hopes to persuade.  Viewed this way a suggestion is made that the International Law 
Commission current project on the identification of International Law Commission promises to 
limit and by so limiting also expand the ICL importance in a post-treaty world.120  
 
International Court of Justice judgement on case concerning Germany v. Italy decision 
in 2012 gave example of CIL as it concerns sovereign immunity. 121 In the judgement ICJ found 
in question whether Italy had violated Germany’s jurisdictional immunity by allowing civil 
claims to be brought against that State in the Italian courts. The Court noted in this respect that 
the question which it was called upon to decide was not whether the acts committed by the 
Third Reich during the Second World War were illegal, but whether, in civil proceedings 
against Germany relating to those acts, the Italian courts were obliged to accord Germany 
immunity. The Court held that the action of the Italian courts in denying Germany immunity 
constituted a breach of Italy’s international obligations. It stated in this connection that, under 
customary international law as it presently stood, a State was not deprived of immunity by 
reason of the fact that it was accused of serious violations of international human rights law or 
the international law of armed conflict.122 
 
 
 
                                                 
119 Sir Michael Wood. 20 Essex Street. Accessile http://www.20essexst.com/member/sir-michael-
wood. (March 02, 2018) 
120 Op cit, Bradley, pp 8-9 
121 Op cit Bradley pp 3 
122  Germany v. Italy, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, ICJ Feb 3, 2012 
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Conclusion 
 
Customary international law is, along with treaties, one of the principal sources of international 
law. Before the proliferation of the treaty making in the twentieth century, customary 
international law was the predominant source, regulating issues such as diplomatic immunity, 
rights of the sea, and the conduct of war. Treaties are written, making their content easier to 
determine, they are expressly negotiated and ratified, making them more consensual and 
making them a potentially better vehicle for addressing the complexity of modern problems.  
 
The systematic study of silence as emerging new customary international law is ever 
evolving.   Inequality among actors as in international community may have grated effect on 
customary law-making as it lacks formalized procedure of law-making and the central role is 
played by behavior. I tried to seek to establish an understanding weather the international 
customary law has changed or evolved about silence over time.  I found during my research 
that silence cannot be interpreted as immediate acceptance of new emerging customary 
international law as silence or inaction is seldom an adequate manifestation of consent.  I view 
that silence should not be interpreted as an acceptance. The conventional view today arises out 
of state practice that is followed out of sense of legal obligation. Agreement of this two element 
definition of Customary International Law, however, has the potential to obscure a lack of 
agreement over issues such as what constitutes state practice, how much state practice is 
enough, and what materials demonstrate a sense of legal obligation (also known as opinion 
juris). Contemporary international lawmaking is characterized by the rapid growth of new soft 
law instruments and a decline in the conclusion of new treaties.  States can establish customary 
international law through three activities- freely subject itself to the customary rule (consent), 
keep silent (acquiescence) or consistently object to the application of the rule.  Silence as 
consent would be different if the state keeps silent, therefore silence cannot be interpreted as 
consent as there is no information what the aim of the state is.  States are bound only to those 
rules and norms what they have consented to.  
 
The state practice essential to establishing customary law must, even if of limited 
duration, be consistent. When there are significant deviations from a practice by states, which 
may include both engaging in an activity and refraining from one, a customary norm cannot 
materialize. Although minor infrequent inconsistencies do not constitute a bar to such 
emergence, repeated inconsistencies generally have to be characterized by other states as 
violations of the norm in question before a customary norm can be said to exist. For instance, 
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it is clear that the prohibition on the use of force set out in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
constitutes a customary norm; yet states have historically engaged in the use of force and 
continue to do so today. The saving factor is that when they do, their conduct is, absent the 
justification of self-defense, typically styled by other states as wrongful.  
 
The wording of Security Council resolution no. 2249 (2015) is unusual to its usual 
strong call to take all measures necessary to take action. No strong wording for concreate action 
leaves room for interpretation and let States to decide whether they need to take action or stand 
still. Meaning state do not say anything and use silence. Therefore Security Council is 
participating in forming silence and it could not be interpreted as an emergence or acceptance 
of new customary law norm as silence.  
 
Security Council has noted and condemned the action about direct or indirect trade 
involvement. If there is a lucrative trade agreement coming up between states there is a 
reasonable ground for the States involved to keep quiet and be silent about it.  I found that if 
there is an economical element attached to States practice about silence there is no possibility 
to interpret the silence as emerging endorsement or acceptance to customary international law 
norm. States keep silent in order to protect their national economic interest.  
 
Traditional view of customary law has many benefits. It gives the customary law the 
rootedness that allows states expectations to converge around norms and puts states on fair 
notice about what is expected of them under those norms. The definition of opinion juris looks 
to the belief of states, not those of scholars, nongovernmental organizations or judges. Thus, 
the focus is on what states believe should be the rules and not on the wishful thinking of others. 
 
The essence of customary law is that it is the unwritten manifestation of the will of the 
international community as a whole, and the fact that, in the past, this has usually occurred 
through the slow accretion of practice is not the essential feature: in short, one should not be 
unduly attached to labels. To the second objection it might perhaps be retorted that although it 
is easy to make statements on the spur of the moment, without any real intention to take them 
seriously or for them to have legal consequences, this is not invariably the case. A formal 
protest, for instance, is a verbal act, but must be taken seriously in the context of the formation 
of customary law. 
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The fight against ISIS (Daesh) has been done via bombing ISIS oil trucks by United Kingdom 
and United States of America. According to  Additional Protocol I (1977) to Geneva 
Convention of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts art 52 (2) states general protection of civilian objects. Paragraph 2 states that Attacks 
shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military 
objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. Art 
51 (5) (b) about protecting of the civilian population states that an attack which may be expected 
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.   
 
In the research I found that the requirement to make an effective contribution to military action 
suggests excluding objects that indirectly support the war effort, such as oil production facilities 
and oil transports not set aside for military use. The targeting of ISIS oil production is 
complicated in that the oil facilities and subsequent revenue are controlled by organized armed 
groups, not a state actor. ISIS does engage in some governance-like activities, it is not a state 
entity and it utilizes the revenue largely to fund insurgency and terrorism-related activities.  
 
Treaty law related to the targeting of civilian objects during a non-international armed conflicts 
is quite limited as compared to the law governing international armed conflicts. The general 
consensus exists that the targeting of civilian objects is prohibited during non-international 
armed conflicts, the particulars of that prohibition have an increased level of ambiguity. Closely 
related to the targeting of oil-related facilities is the issue of targeting individuals operating 
those facilities. The facility workers who are not part of the organized armed groups, in this 
case ISIS, must be considered as civilians when conducting targeting analysis. More 
controversial is the targeting of members of ISIS whose function within the organized armed 
groups is the operation or oversight of oil facilities, as opposed to those ISIS members with 
combat function. Considerable disagreement has emerged over whether members of an 
organized armed groups are required to have a continued combat function to be considered legal 
targets. If such requirement exists, then members of ISIS whose function is solely to operate oil 
production and distribution would not be valid targets. If not then these workers are targetable 
by virtue of their membership in ISIS alone. It is tempting to view the lack of widespread 
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objections by states to the targeting of ISIS oil assets as a signal that states are moving towards 
an acceptance of ISIS oil assets as a signal that states are moving towards an acceptance of 
targeting war-sustaining objects. This may be a political decision based on the widespread 
rejection of ISIS ideology and methods. Ryan Goodman argues “war sustaining objects in non-
international armed conflicts used to generate revenue for an enemy’s armed forces, should be 
targetable under international humanitarian law.”  Targeting War sustaining activities, even in 
the context of the fighting against ISIS, sets dangerous precedent and violates the established 
rules of International Humanitarian Law. The weight of scholarly opinion has long maintained 
that war sustaining objects are not legitimate military targets.  
 
I will conclude my paper by Professor Weil statement and I completely agree with it: 
the purpose of international law throughout the centuries has never been to better mankind, but 
rather has been to ensure a set of universally recognized and agreed upon rules which allow 
mankind to live in relative peace and order.  Given this, the international legal system is always 
looking to ensure that its power and function are universally accepted and applicable. Such a 
system is, by necessity all that international law can ever hope to achieve whilst still maintaining 
universal acceptability. The question remains does current state of affairs need a change in legal 
system? International jurists and commentators must realize that, with the redesigning of the 
general customary norm of state practice and opinio juris, will probably develop contradiction 
and problematic international norms.  
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List of acronyms 
 
CIL- Customary International Law 
ECtHR- European Court on Human Rights 
EU- European Union 
ICJ- International Court of Justice 
ILC- International Law Commission 
IHL- International Humanitarian Law 
ICRC- International Committee of Red Cross 
ISIS- Islamic State of Iraq and the Syria 
NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
R2P- responsibility to protect 
SC- Security Council 
UK- United Kingdom 
UN- United Nations 
USA- United States of America 
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